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REGULATING PROXY PUTS: A 
PROPOSAL TO NARROW THE PROPER 
PURPOSE OF PROXY PUTS AFTER 
SANDRIDGE 
Mark H. Mixon, Jr.* 
In Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery 
broadly characterized proxy puts in general and adopted Unocal to review 
the SandRidge board’s refusal to decide whether to approve a rival proxy 
slate for purposes of neutralizing a proxy put in a bond indenture.  
However, the court failed to answer whether a board has authority to adopt 
a proxy put in the first place, and, if so, whether and under what 
circumstances triggering a proxy put is proportionate to its purpose.  This 
Comment finds the court’s adoption of Unocal unsatisfying doctrinally, yet 
recognizes that the result of subjecting proxy puts to a strict Blasius 
compelling justification review would probably be similar to subjecting a 
watermelon to Gallagher’s sledge:  lenders and borrowers would be 
removing pieces of proxy puts from their loan agreements for weeks.  
Seeking a middle path, this Comment distinguishes Identity Risk as a 
concern separate from Event Risk and proposes narrowing the proper 
purpose of proxy puts to protecting against Identity Risk.  There, Liquid 
Audio emerges as a standard of review blending Blasius’s focus on the 
stockholder franchise with Unocal’s functionality in an Identity Risk 
framework that both legitimizes proxy puts and incentivizes contracting 
parties to document the negotiation and adoption of wealth-maximizing 
change of control provisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc.,1 the Delaware Court of 
Chancery reviewed two primary issues:  the legitimacy of proxy puts 
purporting to protect creditors’ interests; and the appropriate standard of 
review for analyzing board actions that interfere with the stockholder 
franchise.2  A form of change of control covenant often included in bond 
indentures and credit agreements, proxy puts implicate the omnipresent 
specter of board entrenchment addressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.3 due to their defensive, anti-takeover effects.4  However, 
proxy puts arguably also implicate the “compelling justification” standard 
articulated in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.5 “because the effect of 
the [p]roxy [p]ut is to place a toll on the voting decision of the 
electorate[.]”6  As demonstrated by SandRidge’s debt agreements, proxy 
puts are triggered by a successful proxy challenge that replaces a majority 
of a board of directors within a specified period of time and provide 
 
 1.  68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 4.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259. 
 5.  564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 6.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 258. 
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creditors with the right to put the company’s debt back to the company at a 
specified price. 
The core of then-Chancellor Strine’s analysis in SandRidge considers 
whether the SandRidge board of directors reasonably exercised its 
discretion in failing to approve a change of control for purposes of a proxy 
put under the Unocal standard of review—although the court, citing the 
combined Unocal-Blasius standard created by the Delaware Supreme Court 
in MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., left open the possibility of a 
higher standard.7  The court also drew on Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries8 
to focus its good faith analysis under Unocal on whether the board’s failure 
to approve the change of control was for a proper purpose.9  Finding that 
the board’s fiduciary duty to represent in good faith the best interests of its 
stockholders was consistent with its contractual duty of good faith and fair 
dealing owed to its creditors, the court held that “a board may only fail to 
approve a dissident slate if the board determines that passing control . . . 
would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, in particular, because the 
proposed slate poses a danger that the company would not honor its legal 
duty to repay its creditors.”10  Because the SandRidge board could not 
demonstrate a proper purpose for failing to approve the change of control, 
the court concluded the board “likely acted with an absence of good faith 
and reasonableness inconsistent with their fiduciary duties.”11 
However, despite deciding SandRidge on narrow grounds, the court 
left questions unanswered and created ambiguity by broadly characterizing 
a prior case and the proxy puts at issue.  Limited facts necessarily restricted 
the court to a narrow holding and prevented it from conducting a broad 
analysis that would be useful to companies and creditors attempting to 
contract in the shadow of shareholder-creditor agency costs.  In addition, 
despite that proxy puts are thought of as “event risk covenants,” intuition 
suggests that they have nothing to do with events and everything to do with 
the identity of a rival slate; although not heretofore so defined, proxy puts 
are more accurately considered “identity risk covenants.”  Accordingly, this 
Comment attempts to narrow the court’s broad characterizations to address 
 
 7.  813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003) (approving a unified Unocal-Blasius standard of 
review for defensive actions touching on issues of control, but maintaining that: 
When the primary purpose of a board of directors’ defensive measure is to interfere with or 
impede the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested election for 
directors, the board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such action as a 
condition precedent to any judicial consideration of reasonableness and proportiona[lity]. 
(emphasis original)). 
 8.  285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 9.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259. 
 10.  Id. at 260 (citation omitted). 
 11.  Id. at 261. 
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two unanswered questions, resolve ambiguity, and provide clarity to 
contracting parties in the future. 
The court in SandRidge failed to address adequately two questions 
related to the validity of proxy puts.  First, does a board of directors even 
have the requisite authority to bind the corporation to a change of control 
covenant designed to prevent stockholders from electing a new board of 
directors?12  Second, under what circumstances and to what degree is a 
board of directors permitted to trade stockholders’ right to elect the board 
of directors in favor of other interests?  The answer to the first question 
may be simple:  Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
grants the board broad authority to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation,13 and Section 122(13) grants every corporation the power to 
make contracts.14  But Delaware has long recognized that “[t]he 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”15  Without the benefit of the court’s 
analysis, it is unclear whether a board has authority to contract away the 
source of its legitimate power to enter into such a contract. 
The court in SandRidge characterized summarily the proxy puts at 
issue as lacking the “sole or primary purpose” of impeding a stockholder 
election,16 and stated that, “[b]y definition, a contract that imposes a penalty 
on . . . stockholders seeking to elect a new board[] has clear defensive 
value.”17  These broad characterizations enabled the court to avoid 
analyzing whether the board had the requisite power to adopt the proxy 
puts; instead, the “clear defensive value” of the proxy puts merited only 
heightened reasonableness review under Unocal.18  However, this 
 
 12.  This question is the first of two tests of corporate action proposed by Adolf A. 
Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[I]n 
every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do 
with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat 
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide 
powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary”).  Delaware subscribes to 
Berle’s twice-tested approach.  See, e.g., Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 
618, 641 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Corporate acts are ‘twice-tested,’ once for statutory compliance 
and again in equity.”). 
 13.  8 Del. C. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 14.  8 Del. C. § 122(13) (“Every corporation created under this chapter shall have 
power to . . . make contracts . . . .”). 
 15.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).  See also 
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (finding that the board of 
directors could not expand the size of its membership to prevent shareholders from electing 
successor directors). 
 16.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 258. 
 17.  Id. at 259. 
 18.  Id. at 259. 
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Comment recognizes that the result of subjecting proxy puts to a strict 
Blasius compelling-justification review would probably be similar to 
subjecting a watermelon to Gallagher’s sledge:  lenders and borrowers 
would find themselves removing pieces of proxy puts from their loan 
agreements for weeks.19  But characterizing proxy puts broadly so they fit 
into a preferred standard of review is less helpful than developing a more 
nuanced understanding of their purpose, operation, and trade-offs to 
facilitate a more informed analysis of which standard of review ought to 
apply.  This Comment attempts the latter with an eye toward developing a 
balanced outcome consistent with Delaware doctrine. 
In reaching its conclusion in SandRidge, the court also broadly 
characterized a key precedent case, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension 
Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,20 in the following ways.  First, the 
court stated, “Amylin focused on the nature of the Proxy Put as a provision 
giving the creditors protection against a new board that would threaten their 
legitimate interests in getting paid.”21  Also, “[Amylin] recognized that the 
board should take into account the interests of its creditors in deciding 
whether to approve the slate.”22  In addition, “as Vice Chancellor Lamb 
also noted, . . . it follows that a board may only fail to approve a dissident 
slate if the board determines that passing control to the slate would 
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, in particular, because the 
proposed slate poses a danger that the company would not honor its legal 
duty to repay its creditors.”23  The court further characterized Amylin, 
summarizing, “[i]n other words, unless the incumbent board . . . made a 
specific determination that the rival candidates proposed a program that 
would have demonstrably material adverse effects for the corporation’s 
ability to meet its legal obligations to its creditors, the incumbent board 
should approve the rival slate . . . .”24  As will be discussed in greater detail 
 
 19.  Cf. Stephen Byeff, The Spirit Of Blasius: SandRidge As An Antidote To The Poison 
Put, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 412 (2015) (arguing SandRidge should have applied Blasius 
to avoid creating doctrinal confusion and diminishing the primacy of the shareholder 
franchise); Marcus Kai Hintze, “If You Poison Us Do We Not Die?”—A Critical Analysis 
of the Legality of Poison Puts in the Wake of San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. 
Amylin, Inc., 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 767, 793 (2010) (proposing “a rule that any time a board 
of directors enters into an agreement with a proxy put, it must show that it did so with a 
compelling justification”). 
 20.  983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 21.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260. 
 22.  Id. at 260, fn 95.  The court goes on, reading the statement “as qualifying the 
[Amylin] court’s later statement, in a footnote, that ‘the directors are under absolutely no 
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders’ in deciding whether to approve the 
new slate.”  Id. (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37). 
 23.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (second emphasis added). 
 24.  Id. at 246.  The court goes on, concluding, “absent any determination by the 
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below, in none of these instances was the court in Amylin focused on 
creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid or on threats to the company’s 
ability to repay its creditors. 
These broad characterizations of Amylin raise the second question left 
unanswered in SandRidge:  assuming Delaware law permits a board to 
bargain away some of the stockholders’ fundamental right to elect directors 
in favor of creditors’ interests in getting paid, under what circumstances 
and to what degree would such a trade-off be reasonable or proportionate?  
In other words, if proxy puts represent a legitimate trade-off between 
creditors’ interests in getting paid and stockholders’ right to elect a new 
board, how much of the shareholder franchise may the board trade away, 
and under what circumstances?  By its nature, this bargain benefits both 
creditors and boards at the expense of “the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power exists.”25  Although the Unocal 
standard of review that the court adopted in SandRidge would have enabled 
it to conduct such a proportionality analysis, the limited facts of the case 
narrowed the basis for its conclusion to Unocal’s good faith prong.  And 
even though Unocal provides a functional standard of review for proxy 
puts, it still does not answer whether a board has the authority to adopt 
proxy puts without some showing that a compelling justification supports 
their facially disenfranchising effects. 
Therefore, this Comment considers both the circumstances under 
which boards may validly adopt and exercise proxy puts and the 
proportionality of proxy puts to their purpose using Liquid Audio’s unified 
Unocal-Blasius standard of review.  Throughout, this Comment is mindful 
of Professor Edward Rock’s suggestion that “Delaware should worry [that 
investors believe it favors equity over debt], if inadequate creditor 
protection raises a firm’s cost of capital and thereby affects the desirability 
of Delaware law.”26  In Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 
Rock surveys evidence suggesting that the classic shareholder-manager 
agency cost problem no longer remains significant.27  For discussion 
purposes, this Comment presupposes the accuracy of Rock’s suggestion 
that shareholder-manager agency costs have been regulated effectively and 
 
incumbents that the rival slate has suspect integrity or specific plans that would endanger the 
corporation’s ability to repay its creditors, there is no harm threatened to the creditors by the 
election of the slate.”  Id. 
 25.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 26.  Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1986 (2013). 
 27.  See Rock, supra note 26, at 1926 (noting that incentive compensation, board 
reforms, and changes in concentration of shareholdings are among the reasons why the 
shareholder-manager agency cost problem is no longer significant). 
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considers how Delaware courts can adapt existing corporate law doctrines 
to regulate shareholder-creditor agency costs by focusing narrowly on the 
proxy puts at issue in SandRidge. 
To consider the questions left unanswered in SandRidge, this 
Comment proceeds as follows.  Part II reviews the two cases interpreting 
proxy puts that predate SandRidge.  Part III details the facts, analysis, and 
conclusions of SandRidge itself with the goal of confining the case as 
narrowly as possible.  Part IV considers briefly the impact of a recent 
decision on the court’s analysis in SandRidge.  Part V examines the nature 
of proxy puts more closely and proposes to narrow the court’s broad 
characterization of the device’s purpose.  Part VI proposes a framework of 
review for proxy puts with the goals of addressing the questions left 
unanswered in SandRidge and enabling Delaware to better regulate 
shareholder-creditor agency costs in the future.  Part VII concludes. 
I. PRECEDENT CASES ADDRESSING PROXY PUTS 
The Delaware Court of Chancery decided two cases concerning proxy 
puts prior to SandRidge.  In Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic,28 the court reviewed 
change of control covenants, which the Hills board had added to managers’ 
employment agreements during a takeover battle, under the good faith 
prong of Unocal.29  In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin 
Pharmaceuticals,30 the court interpreted a bond indenture to determine 
whether the Amylin board had the contractual power and right to approve a 
change of control and neutralize proxy puts.31  Importantly, although both 
cases discussed a board’s duty to consider in good faith the best interests of 
their company and its stockholders under Unocal, neither proceeded to 
analyze the reasonableness or proportionality of the board’s action under 
Unocal’s second prong.  As such, both Hills and Amylin are narrow 
decisions. 
A. Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic 
The dispute in Hills concerned the Hills board’s decision to trigger 
change of control provisions embedded in certain senior executives’ 
severance agreements.32  One year after Hills had emerged from bankruptcy 
in 1993, Dickstein Partners, a 12% shareholder, initiated a consent 
 
 28.  769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 29.  Id. at 106–07. 
 30.  983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 31.  Id. at 313. 
 32.  Hills, 769 A.2d 88, 89 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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solicitation to replace four Hills directors and to cause Hills to conduct a 
share buyback using leveraged financing.33  With the advice of outside 
counsel, the board opposed the buyback, believing “it was unwise to take 
on such substantial debt so soon after emerging from bankruptcy and that it 
was preferable to stick with management’s existing game plan.”34  The 
company, among other things, entered into new employment agreements 
with top executives “to allow them to focus on doing their jobs without 
distraction by Dickstein’s overtures.”35  The agreements included change of 
control covenants entitling the executives to severance equaling three times 
their annual salary (including bonuses and tax gross-ups) in the event of a 
change of control not approved by a majority of continuing directors.36  
After Dickstein and others filed class and derivative actions challenging the 
employment agreements, the parties reached a settlement agreement in 
which, among other things, the parties agreed to waive permanently any 
claims arising out of the agreements.37 
But in 1995, Dickstein again became hostile, proposing to take over 
Hills by merger or proxy contest and promising to refinance Hills’ existing 
debt, purchase Hills, and auction Hills to the highest third-party buyer.38  At 
a meeting of the Hills board, the outside directors decided to reject the 
Dickstein proposal as inadequate for several reasons:  “the company’s 
current strategy was sound,” “it was a bad time to sell a low-end retailing 
company,” “the Dickstein leverage strategy was of the kind that had caused 
other retailers to descend into bankruptcy,” and “Dickstein had not secured 
firm financing for its Proposal.”39  In addition, management expressed its 
view that “it would prefer not to work at Hills under Dickstein’s plan, 
because that plan would leave the company in a highly leveraged 
condition.”40  The board sought reelection against Dickstein’s proposed 
 
 33.  Id. at 91. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 92.  The agreement defined an Approved Change of Control as follows: 
The term “Approved Change of Control” shall mean a Change of Control that has occurred 
with the prior approval of a majority of the Continuing Directors and the term “Continuing 
Director” shall mean any member of the Board of Directors of the Company who is not an 
Acquiring Person or a nominee or representative of an Acquiring Person or of any affiliate 
or associate of an Acquiring Person and any successor to a Continuing Director who was 
recommended for election or elected to succeed a Continuing Director by a majority of the 
Continuing Directors then on the Board of Directors of the Company. 
Id. 
 37.  Id. at 93. 
 38.  Id. at 94–95. 
 39.  Id. at 97. 
 40.  Id. at 96. 
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slate and did not erect any additional defensive measures.41 
Considering whether to approve the Dickstein change of control for 
purposes of the severance agreements, the board focused on its contractual 
duties to the covered executives and recognized Hills faced “exactly the 
circumstances that had been anticipated going to contract[.]”42  The board 
believed it owed a contractual duty to trigger the severance unless they 
“believed in good faith that the Change in Control was not harmful to the 
company.”43  Because the board continued to believe, as they had upon 
entering into the severance agreements, that “the Dickstein Change in 
Control would be seriously adverse to the interests of the company and its 
stockholders[,]” the board voted to trigger the severance package.44  Later, 
after receiving complete and adequate disclosure, the shareholders elected 
Dickstein’s slate by a large margin, thus triggering, among other things,45 
the severance packages under the employment agreements.46 
After taking control of Hills, Dickstein caused the company to sue the 
former board for breaching its duty of loyalty by failing to approve the 
change of control for purposes of the severance agreements.47  For our 
purposes, the critical question facing the court was under which standard 
should the change of control covenants be reviewed.48  “Because of the 
defensive origins and purpose of the employment agreements, [the court 
applied] the Unocal standard of review[.]”49  However, the court found that 
the previous settlement agreement, to which both Dickstein and Hills were 
parties, prevented the plaintiffs from challenging the board’s initial 
decision to enter into the severance agreements in the first place, thus 
conceding “that those Agreements were entered into for a proper purpose 
and that Hills received adequate consideration[.]”50 
This factor affected which standard of review the court chose to adopt 
and how that standard of review applied.  First, the court refused to apply 
the Blasius “compelling justification” standard of review because the 
plaintiffs were “estopped from arguing . . . that the Employment 
Agreements were entered into for the ‘primary purpose of thwarting the 
 
 41.  Id. at 97. 
 42.  Id. at 101 (citation omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 101. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  The successful proxy contest triggered several change of control provisions.  In 
particular, “Hills’s primary creditor, Chemical Bank, exercised its default rights, forcing 
Dickstein to refinance the company’s debt.”  Id. at 101. 
 46.  Id. at 101. 
 47.  Id. at 90. 
 48.  Id. at 103. 
 49.  Id. at 90 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). 
 50.  Id. at 102. 
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exercise of a stockholder vote.’”51  The plaintiffs attempted to argue that 
the agreements had “the incidental effect of coercing or placing an undue 
toll on the free exercise of the shareholder vote[,]” but the court rejected 
this argument by recasting it as implicating Unocal’s proportionality prong 
instead.52  Nevertheless, upon considering the coercion issue, the court 
again insisted that the plaintiffs were “estopped from making the argument 
that the Severance is so large as to constitute a coercive influence on a Hills 
stockholder vote.”53 
Second, after the court concluded that Unocal was the appropriate 
standard of review, the court reiterated the significance of the plaintiffs’ 
previous waiver of the right to challenge the board’s adoption of the 
employment agreements.  Under Unocal’s two-pronged inquiry,54 the board 
must first demonstrate that, “after a reasonable investigation, it determined 
in good faith that the corporation faced a threat warranting a defensive 
response” before demonstrating “the proportionality of its defensive 
measures to the threats it identified.”55  However, because the plaintiffs 
were estopped from challenging the validity of the agreements and that the 
agreements were disproportionate, “the first prong is of preeminent 
importance.”56  In other words, for the plaintiffs to prevail on their breach 
of loyalty claim, they would have to prove to the court that the board had 
failed to make “a good faith and informed judgment that the Dickstein 
Change in Control was a threat to Hills and its stockholders.”57  This the 
plaintiffs could not do. 
The court concluded that the board’s informed, good faith belief that 
the change of control posed a threat of harm to the company and its 
stockholders, as well as its belief that it should live up to its contractual 
commitment, was reasonable under the circumstances.58  In sum, the 
board’s decision to trigger the severance packages was not a breach of its 
fiduciary duty of loyalty because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence 
challenging the board’s decision under the first prong of Unocal and was 
estopped from raising any challenges as to proportionality under Unocal’s 
second prong.  Instead, the court concluded that the board’s decision “to 
take a consistent approach to the issue of whether to approve the Dickstein 
 
 51.  Id. at 103 (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660). 
 52.  Id. at 103. 
 53.  Id. at 104. 
 54.  As the Hills case was decided in 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court had not yet 
combined the Unocal and Blasius standards of review in its Liquid Audio decision, which 
was decided in 2007. 
 55.  Hills, 769 A.2d at 107 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955–57). 
 56.  Id. at 107. 
 57.  Id. at 108. 
 58.  Id. at 109. 
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Change in Control was a reasonable response in the circumstances 
presented.”59  In so concluding, the court endorsed the board’s outside 
counsel’s advice that because the board believed in good faith that the 
Dickstein Change of Control was not in the best interests of Hills and its 
stockholders upon entering into the employment agreements, the board’s 
subsequent decision to trigger the severance package was justified in light 
of its continued belief that the Dickstein Change of Control was still, and 
for the same reasons, not in the best interests of Hills and its stockholders.60 
It is important to recognize the narrow basis on which the court 
decided the Hills case.  First, because of a prior settlement, the court 
estopped the plaintiffs from challenging any aspect of the board’s initial 
decision to enter into the employment agreements containing change of 
control provisions.  In the court’s words, “[I] will . . . only allow them to 
challenge whether the [board] made appropriate decisions in 1995 
regarding whether to oppose the Dickstein Change in Control and to trigger 
the Covered Executives Right to Severance.”61  Thus, Hills focuses 
narrowly on the board’s decision to trigger the change of control 
provisions.  Second, the plaintiffs also were estopped from challenging the 
proportionality of the board’s decision to trigger the change of control 
provisions under Unocal’s second prong.  Therefore, the court’s holding in 
Hills that the board’s decision to trigger the change of control provisions 
was reasonable in the circumstances stands only on the court’s narrow 
analysis of the board’s good faith and informed judgment that the change 
of control was a threat to the company and its stockholders under Unocal’s 
first prong. 
B. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
In 2009, the court further analyzed a board’s contractual power and 
right to approve a change of control in Amylin.  The narrow question at 
issue in Amylin was “whether a commonplace provision found in a trust 
indenture governing publicly traded notes prevents the issuer’s board of 
directors from ‘approving’ as ‘continuing directors’ persons nominated by 
stockholders in opposition to the slate nominated by the incumbent 
directors.”62  Finding that such a narrow interpretation would cause change 
of control covenants to “operate as improper entrenchment devices that 
 
 59.  Id. at 108. 
 60.  Id. at 100. 
 61.  Id. at 103. 
 62.  San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
ARTICLE 7 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:22 PM 
1324 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
coerce stockholders into voting only for persons approved by the 
incumbent board[,]” the court held that the directors had the contractual 
power under the indentures to “approve” any nominee and still seek 
reelection.63 
However, the court never directly answered whether the Amylin board 
had properly exercised that right consistent with its implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing.  The court said “the measure of whether the approval 
was in good faith was whether the board believed that the dissident slate 
posed a danger to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”64  
But the court found that the record as to the board’s deliberations regarding 
whether the dissident slate posed a threat was undeveloped65 and held that 
the contractual right to approve issue was unripe.66 
Although the Amylin case began as a stockholder class action against 
the company and its individual directors, it is a contract case, not a 
fiduciary duty case; the court’s primary holding arose from the company’s 
cross-claim against the trustee of its bond indentures.  In March 2009, 
plaintiff pension fund San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund filed a class 
action complaint alleging various breaches of fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty against Amylin and its individual directors.67  In April, plaintiff 
added to the complaint Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”)—the 
Administrative Agent for Amylin’s senior secured credit agreement dated 
December 21, 2007 (“Credit Agreement”)68—and The Bank of New York 
Mellon Trust Company, N.A.—the “Trustee” under the trust indenture 
dated June 8, 2007 (the “Indenture”) for Amylin’s 3.00% convertible senior 
notes due 2014 (the “2007 Notes”)69—as necessary defendants, seeking 
declaratory judgments as to the company’s contractual rights with both.70  
Shortly thereafter, the individual directors and Amylin answered the 
plaintiff’s complaint and included a cross-claim against the Trustee.71 
Before trial, the plaintiff entered into a partial settlement with 
 
 63.  Id. at 307. 
 64.  Id. at 316 (citing Hills, at 108–09). 
 65.  Id. at 317.  To the extent it was, the court observed that the decision to approve 
may not have been the good faith exercise of the board’s considered business judgment.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 318.  The court qualified its decision to treat the issue as unripe by pointing 
out that no result of the current election could trigger the covenants at issue and that the 
parties were free to replead a case after the election when the facts of the record would be 
more developed.  Id. at 317. 
 67.  Id. at 311. 
 68.  Id. at 307. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 311. 
 71.  Id. 
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Amylin.72  In addition, Amylin and BANA reached a consent and waiver 
agreement before trial that mooted the related claims against BANA.73  
Finally, the stockholders planning proxy contests reduced the number of 
insurgents they had nominated such that the change of control provisions 
under the Indenture could no longer be immediately triggered.74  “Thus, the 
central issue in [Amylin] is whether or not the Amylin board has both the 
power and the right under the Indenture to approve the stockholder 
nominees.”75 
The Indenture operated by declaring an event of default to have 
occurred upon a “Fundamental Change,” which was defined to have 
occurred if, among other things, “at any time the Continuing Directors do 
not constitute a majority of the Company’s Board of Directors . . . .”76  The 
agreement further defined “Continuing Directors” to be: 
(i) individuals who on the Issue Date constituted the Board of 
Directors and (ii) any new directors whose election to the Board 
of Directors or whose nomination for election by the stockholders 
of the Company was approved by at least a majority of the 
directors then still in office (or a duly constituted committee 
thereof) either who were directors on the Issue Date or whose 
election or nomination for election was previously so approved.77 
By contrast, the Change of Control covenant in the Credit Agreement 
defines Continuing Directors directly within its terms and uses a narrower 
definition.  Under the Credit Agreement, a Change of Control occurs if, 
among other things: 
An event or series of events by which . . . (b) during any period 
of 24 consecutive months, a majority of the members of the 
board of directors or other equivalent governing body of the 
Company cease to be composed of individuals 
 
(i) who were members of that board or equivalent governing 
body on the first day of such period, 
 
(ii) whose election or nomination to that board or equivalent 
governing body was approved by individuals referred to in clause 
(i) above constituting at the time of such election or nomination 
at least a majority of that board or equivalent governing body, or 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 312. 
 74.  Id. at 313. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 308. 
 77.  Id. 
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(iii) whose election or nomination to that board or other 
equivalent governing body was approved by individuals referred 
to in clauses (i) and (ii) above constituting at the time of such 
election or nomination at least a majority of that board or 
equivalent governing body (excluding, in the case of both clause 
(ii) and (iii), any individual whose initial nomination for, or 
assumption of office as, a member of that board or equivalent 
governing body occurs as a result of an actual or threatened 
solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal of 
one or more directors by any person or group other than a 
solicitation for the election of one or more directors by or on 
behalf of the board of directors).78 
Compared to the language in the bond indenture, the emphasized language 
in the credit agreement precludes stockholders from replacing directors 
pursuant to an actual or threatened proxy fight or consent solicitation.  In 
other words, the provision precludes the stockholders from contesting the 
incumbency of the board without risking a default. 
The court interpreted the Continuing Director provision in the bond 
indenture as giving the board the power to “approve” a rival slate for 
purposes of neutralizing the proxy put and still nominate its own candidates 
to contest the rivals.79  But it also contrasted this outcome to its 
interpretation of the Credit Agreement, which, by comparison, it suggested 
“would prohibit any change in the majority of the board as a result of any 
number of contested elections, for the entire life of the notes.”80  
Continuing, the court warned that “such an eviscerating effect on the 
stockholder franchise would raise grave concerns[,]” that the court would 
expect to see evidence that the board received “extraordinarily valuable 
economic benefits for the corporation that would not otherwise be available 
to it[,] and that “the court would have to closely consider the degree to 
which such a provision might be unenforceable as against public policy.”81 
Similar to the court’s decision in Hills, it is important to recognize 
what the court did and did not do in Amylin.  First, the central issue in 
Amylin is one of pure contract interpretation, namely, whether the board 
has the power and right under the Indenture to approve the stockholder 
nominees.  Second, after finding the board’s contractual right under the 
Indenture to approve stockholder nominees was limited only by its implied 
 
 78.  Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
 79.  Id. at 314. 
 80.  Id. at 315. 
 81.  Id. 
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duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from the Indenture,82 the court 
concluded that the record as to whether the board had exercised its 
discretion was incomplete and thus held the issue to be unripe.83  Therefore, 
the court in Amylin held only that the board had the power under the 
Indenture to approve the stockholder nominees and still run its own slate 
against them.  Accordingly, the court’s discussion of the board’s right 
under the Indenture to approve the stockholder nominees was dicta. 
Nevertheless, given the court’s later reliance on Amylin in SandRidge, 
a closer look at the Amylin court’s interpretation of Hills is useful.  In 
keeping with its contractual interpretation inquiry, the Amylin court found 
that the Hills court, “in considering whether the board was justified [under 
its contractual duties] in not approving the change in control, recognized 
that the measure of whether the approval was in good faith was whether the 
board believed that the dissident slate posed a danger to the interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders.”84  The court stated its rule, relying on 
Hills, to be that “the board may approve the stockholder nominees if the 
board determines in good faith that the election of one or more of the 
dissident nominees would not be materially adverse to the interests of the 
corporation or its stockholders.”85 
Hanging a footnote on this rule, the court qualified it, saying: 
In other words, [the board may approve the stockholder nominees 
if the board determines in good faith that] passing control would 
not constitute a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty to the 
corporation and its stockholders.  It is important to recognize here 
that the directors are under absolutely no obligation to consider 
the interests of the noteholders in making this determination.86 
Maintaining the context of the court’s contractual interpretation inquiry, the 
second half of this footnote must be read directionally.  Independent of any 
consideration of the interests of its creditors, a board’s fiduciary duties 
require it to determine in good faith whether passing control to stockholder 
nominees would be materially adverse to the interests of the corporation or 
its stockholders, or in other words, whether passing control would 
constitute a breach of its duty of loyalty to the corporation and its 
stockholders.  After making such a determination in the negative, a board 
may approve stockholder nominees without breaching its implied 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.87  Importantly, this 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 317. 
 84.  Id. at 316 (bracketed language added). 
 85.  Id. at 316. 
 86.  Id. at 316 n.37 (bracketed language added). 
 87.  Id. at 316. 
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bifurcated approach comports with the Hills case, where the board made a 
determination, independent of any consideration of the interests of its 
contractual counterparties, that the change of control was a harmful threat 
to Hills and its stockholders.88 
The court found the application of its rule to be problematic—and for 
good reason.  First, the court acknowledged that Amylin had presented “no 
evidence regarding the board’s deliberation with respect to the decision to 
approve the stockholder-nominated slate[,]”89 and that “circumstances at 
least raise a question whether the board’s decision to approve was made in 
a good faith exercise of its considered business judgment[.]”90  For that 
reason, the court held that the contractual right to approve issue was unripe.  
Second, although unacknowledged, the court failed to recognize in its 
contractual duty of good faith analysis that it also had no evidence 
regarding the board’s deliberation with respect to the decision to enter into 
the change of control provisions in the first place.  In fact, the question was 
not even at issue beyond a duty of care claim that the court quickly 
resolved at the end of the opinion.91 
But Amylin’s statement of its rule is partially inconsistent with Hills 
and in need of clarification.  As discussed above, the board in Hills would 
have breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by approving 
the Dickstein Change of Control because its good faith, informed judgment 
that the change of control would be harmful to the company and its 
stockholders that motivated the board’s adoption of the employment 
agreements containing the change of control provisions had persisted until 
they reached an identical judgment and decided to trigger the provisions.  
In other words, because the circumstances that motivated the board’s 
adoption of the agreement were part of the contract’s consideration, the fact 
that those exact circumstances persisted framed the board’s later decision 
to grant the bargained-for consideration as required by its contractual duty 
of good faith.  The board in Amylin made no such determination. 
The rule in Amylin is thus clarified as follows:  A board has the 
contractual right under a proxy put to approve a rival slate if (1) the board 
determines on an informed, good faith basis that passing control to the rival 
slate would not be a breach of its duty of loyalty, and (2) approving the 
rival slate is not a breach of the board’s implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing under the proxy put.  In Amylin, the court held that the facts 
 
 88.  Hills, 769 A.2d at 108–09.  See also Hills, 769 A.2d at 100 (“[Hills’s counsel Allen 
Finkelson] advised the board that the obligation of the directors was to determine whether a 
Dickstein-led change in control of Hills was in the best interests of Hills stockholders.”). 
 89.  Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316. 
 90.  Id. at 317. 
 91.  Id. at 318. 
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necessary to deciding the first part of the rule were unripe and did not 
conduct an analysis under the second part.  Also, the rule is consistent with 
the outcome of Hills; because the court held that the Hills board determined 
in good faith that passing control to Dickstein would be a breach of its duty 
of loyalty, the board had properly determined that it had no contractual 
right to approve the change of control under the proxy put. 
Nevertheless, neither the court’s analysis nor its rule provides 
meaningful insight into whether the board properly discharged its fiduciary 
duties.  In other words, Amylin’s rule is properly limited to the narrow 
context of determining whether a board satisfied its contractual duty of 
good faith and fair dealing—especially considering the court’s holding that 
the issue was unripe.  This narrow interpretation is framed by the reality 
that the analysis in question arose from Amylin’s cross-claim against the 
Trustee of the Indenture. 
II. KALLICK V. SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC. 
The case of SandRidge involved a board of directors that refused to 
neutralize a proxy put by approving a rival proxy slate on the grounds that 
the rival slate was less qualified.92  Plaintiff-stockholder Gerald Kallick 
filed a complaint against SandRidge and its individual directors in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery and moved for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, seeking 
(i) to enjoin the defendants from soliciting any consent 
revocations; (ii) to have any consent revocations obtained to date 
declared invalid; and (iii) to enjoin the defendants from taking 
any steps to hinder TPG’s consent solicitation until they have 
complied with their fiduciary duties and have approved the TPG 
slate, or have explained in full why they will not approve it.93 
The court applied Delaware’s three-pronged standard for a preliminary 
injunction to grant Kallick more narrowly tailored injunctive relief than he 
had sought and no mandatory or declaratory relief.94  But the court did not 
analyze each prong individually; instead, the court “discuss[ed] the facts in 
the record and the applicable law, and explain[ed] why the defendants are 
likely violating their fiduciary duty of loyalty to SandRidge and its 
 
 92.  Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 245 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 93.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 252. 
 94.  Id. at 253.  The court stated the standard as follows: “To prevail on a motion for 
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits 
of his claims; (2) he will suffer imminent, irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; 
and (3) the balance of equities weighs in favor of issuing the injunction.”  Id.  (citing 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)). 
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stockholders.”95  As to the defendants’ justifications for failing to decide 
whether to approve the rival proxy slate, the court made “findings of fact as 
to them consistent with the appropriate procedural standard, which requires 
[the court] to determine, from the record before [the court], what would 
likely be the state of reality found to exist after trial.”96 
This Part will analyze and attempt to narrow SandRidge by tracking 
the structure used by the court therein.  Part A sets out the background to 
the dispute, as well as the court’s findings of fact regarding the defendants’ 
proffered justifications for their challenged actions.  Part B reviews the 
court’s decision to adopt a Unocal standard of review.  Part C analyzes the 
court’s holding that the board’s actions were likely a violation of its 
fiduciary duties.  Part D notes the court’s efforts to distinguish the Hills 
case. 
A. Background to the Dispute and Findings of Fact 
SandRidge Energy was an oil and natural gas exploration and 
production company97 that went public in 2007.98  In November 2012, after 
six years of “abysmal” performance and “lavish[ing] compensation” on its 
CEO, the SandRidge board became the target of a consent solicitation 
seeking to amend the bylaws to destagger the board, remove all directors, 
and install an entirely new slate.99  TPG-Axon (“TPG”), the hedge fund 
seeking the consent solicitation, also sought to include stockholder 
representatives, replace the CEO, and investigate strategic alternatives to 
maximize the value of SandRidge’s assets, including an asset sale.100  TPG 
filed its preliminary consent solicitation statement on December 26, 
2012.101 
In response to TPG, the incumbent board adopted a poison pill, 
restricted stockholders’ ability to act by written consent, and required an 
affirmative vote of more than 50% of all stockholders to amend bylaws 
relating to director elections.102  In addition, on December 27, 2012, the 
incumbent board filed a preliminary consent revocation statement warning 
stockholders that replacing the board without its approval would trigger 
 
 95.  Id. at 253. 
 96.  Id. at 253 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Bayer CropScience L.P., 958 
A.2d 245, 251–52 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 97.  Id. at 244. 
 98.  Id. at 248–49. 
 99.  Id. at 244. 
 100.  Id. at 249.  Another major stockholder echoed TPG-Axon’s concerns with 
SandRidge a few days later.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 250. 
 102.  Id. at 249. 
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change of control covenants in the company’s bond indentures and require 
SandRidge to offer to repurchase $4.3 billion of debt from its lenders at 
101% of par.103 
Throughout its opinion, the court refers to the change of control 
covenant at issue as a “Proxy Put,” explaining that “the term is 
appropriate[] because the Proxy Put gives the noteholders the right to put 
back their debt after a vote that seats a new board that has not been 
approved by the ousted incumbents.”104  Comparing the term “Proxy Put” 
to “poison pill,” the court emphasized that it implied “no judgment about 
the device’s utility” and only meant to “use language that tracks the 
device’s operation.”105  Under the indentures at issue in SandRidge, a 
Change of Control occurs if, 
during any period of two consecutive years, individuals who at 
the beginning of such period constituted the Board of Directors 
of the Company or any Successor Parent (together with any new 
directors whose election to such board or whose nomination for 
election by the stockholders of the Company or any Successor 
Parent, as the case may be, was approved by a vote of 66 2/3% of 
the directors then still in office who were either directors at the 
beginning of such period or whose election or nomination for 
election was previously so approved), cease for any reason to 
constitute a majority of such Board of Directors then in office.106 
SandRidge had entered into multiple note agreements, all identical in 
relevant part, beginning in 2008, but the record surrounding whether the 
lender or SandRidge had sought to include the Proxy Puts was 
nonexistent.107  From the outset, the court noted that, consistent with Moran 
v. Household International, Inc.,108 a plaintiff could challenge both a 
board’s decision to agree to a change of control covenant and whether the 
board properly used its discretion under the covenant to approve a change 
 
 103.  Id. at 250. 
 104.  Id. at 244, n. 8. 
 105.  Id.  Despite the court’s comparison of the terms, proxy puts and poison pills differ 
in one doctrinally significant respect: the supreme court validated poison pills in part upon 
the recognition that they do not materially interfere with the stockholder franchise.  See Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 96 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Notably, the pill in 
Moran was considered reasonable in part because the Court found that there were many 
methods by which potential acquirors could get around the pill.  One way around the pill 
was the ‘proxy out’—bidders could solicit consents to remove the board and redeem the 
rights.”) (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).  In other 
words, proxy puts are not like poison pills because unapproved proxy fights do not trigger 
poison pills. 
 106.  Id. at 250 (emphasis added by court). 
 107.  Id. at 247–48. 
 108.  500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
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of control.109  Here, however, because no record of negotiations existed, 
both the plaintiff and the court were limited to attacking and analyzing the 
board’s exercise of discretion required by the Proxy Put.  Accordingly, the 
court assumed the “provisions were accepted by management without 
resistance and without any input from the board.”110 
On January 15, 2013, TPG filed its definitive consent solicitation 
statement with the SEC.111  The board then filed its definitive consent 
revocation statement on January 18, reiterating the potential harm to 
stockholders if the Proxy Puts were triggered, but also admitting that “if the 
Board takes actions to approve the TPG-Axon Group Nominees that are 
permitted by the Indentures, such refinancing would not be required.”112  
However, the board stated that it had not yet decided whether it would 
approve TPG’s slate.113 
A month later, the board stated in an 8-K that because the debt at issue 
was trading above 101% of par, the bondholders were “unlikely” to redeem 
them, but that the company could obtain any financing necessary if notes 
were redeemed.114  Accordingly, the board changed its position on the 
threat posed by an unapproved slate, suggesting that the election of an 
unapproved slate might have no impact on the company.115  Nevertheless, 
the board continued to refuse to decide whether to approve TPG’s proposed 
slate for purposes of the Proxy Put.116 
In support of their refusal to approve TPG’s slate for purposes of the 
Proxy Put, the defendants proffered the following justifications:  (1) “that 
the TPG slate does not consist of directors with sufficient energy 
experience[,]”117 and (2) granting approval “would compromise the 
company’s ability to obtain financing because . . . such lenders would 
charge a higher price for credit, perceiving SandRidge as a company that 
‘circumvents’ change of control provisions.”118  As to the defendants’ first 
argument, the court found that “[n]othing in this record indicates that any 
incumbent board member or incumbent board advisor has any reasonable 
basis to dispute the basic qualifications of the TPG slate.”119  As to the 
 
 109.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 247. 
 110.  Id. at 248. 
 111.  Id. at 251. 
 112.  Id. (citing Pl.’s Ex. P (SandRidge Energy, Inc., Definitive Consent Revocation 
Statement (Jan. 18, 2013) at 8 [hereinafter Definitive Consent Revocation Statement]). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 251–52. 
 115.  Id. at 252. 
 116.  Id. at 257. 
 117.  Id. at 253. 
 118.  Id. at 255. 
 119.  Id. 
ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:22 PM 
2015] REGULATING PROXY PUTS 1333 
 
defendants’ second argument, the court found that “[t]he incumbent board 
has identified no specific threat that the TPG slate’s plans have on the 
ability of SandRidge to repay its creditors.”120 
To support this conclusion, the court noted that 
the incumbent board and its financial advisors have failed to 
provide any reliable market evidence that lenders place a tangible 
value on a Proxy Put trigger—not a change in a board 
composition accompanying a merger or acquisition or another 
type of event having consequences for the company’s capital 
structure, but a mere change in the board majority.121 
In addition, in his deposition, one of SandRidge’s independent directors 
admitted that the company derives no benefit from the Proxy Puts.122  
According to the court, “[t]his testimony implies that the board gave little 
or no consideration to the adoption of the Proxy Put.”123 
B. The Standard of Review 
The defendants argued that the correct standard of review should be 
Delaware’s business judgment rule, under which the court would defer to 
the incumbent board’s decision not to approve TPG’s slate if it was 
supported by a rational business purpose.124  The plaintiff, on the other 
hand, argued that the court should apply the “compelling justification” 
standard “because the effect of the Proxy Put is to place a toll on the voting 
decision of the electorate [and] the primary purpose of such a provision is 
disenfranchising within the meaning of the Blasius standard.”125  To trigger 
Blasius, “the challenged action had to be ‘taken for the sole or primary 
purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote.’”126 
The court rejected a stand-alone Blasius standard because it “does 
little to address situations like this, where a contractual provision cannot be 
said to have the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the stockholders’ 
vote[.]”127  Instead, the court chose to focus its Unocal analysis using 
“Schnell’s generalized insistence that any director action be in fact taken 
for a proper purpose.”128  In adopting a Unocal standard of review, the 
 
 120.  Id. at 257. 
 121.  Id. at 256. 
 122.  Id. at 257. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 258. 
 126.  Id. at 258 (citing Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662). 
 127.  Id. at 258. 
 128.  Id. at 259 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 
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court reasoned that “Unocal is the proper standard of review to examine a 
board’s decision to agree to a contract with [change of control provisions] 
and to review a board’s exercise of discretion as to the change of control 
provisions under such a contract.”129  To support its decision, the court 
broadly characterized Proxy Puts as “a contract that imposes a penalty on 
the corporation [and stockholders seeking to elect a new board]” that has 
“clear defensive value.”130 
Although a reliable shoehorn to invoking a preferred standard of 
review, this broad characterization of proxy puts is neither precise nor 
desirable.  By characterizing proxy puts as contracts with clear defensive 
value, the court sidestepped silently the question of whether the SandRidge 
board had the authority to adopt the proxy puts in the first place.  The court 
was able to do so in part because the plaintiff’s claim focused narrowly on 
whether the board exercised its contractual discretion under the proxy puts 
consistent with its fiduciary duties and not whether the board’s decision to 
adopt the Proxy Puts was valid, and also in part because the record 
surrounding the board’s negotiation of the Proxy Puts was nonexistent.131  
Without a record as to the purpose or intended design and effect of the 
Proxy Puts, the court exercised its discretion to broadly characterize the 
device as a contract with clear defensive value that “cannot be said to have 
the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the stockholders’ vote[,]”132 
instead assuming that they “might have a legitimate purpose of protecting 
creditors who in fact insisted on its inclusion for their own good-faith 
reasons[.]”133  This Comment considers a more precise characterization of 
proxy puts in Part V. 
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that the court partially supported 
its decision to apply the Unocal standard of review by citing to the 
Delaware Supreme Court case MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, 
Inc.,134 which the court characterized as “provid[ing] a responsible form of 
review that smokes out self-interest and pretext[] by requiring boards that 
face the omnipresent specter of Unocal to justify their actions as reasonable 
in relationship to a threat faced by the corporation.”135  However, in Liquid 
Audio, the supreme court held that 
[t]o invoke the Blasius compelling justification standard of 
 
1971)). 
 129.  Id. at 259 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 130.  Id. at 259. 
 131.  Id. at 247–48. 
 132.  Id. at 258. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d at 1129. 
 135.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259. 
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review within an application of the Unocal standard of review, 
the defensive actions of the board only need to be taken for the 
primary purpose of interfering with or impeding the effectiveness 
of the stockholder vote in a contested election for directors.136 
Thus, despite the court’s clear statement in SandRidge that it was applying 
Unocal, one could argue that it was applying Liquid Audio’s unified 
standard of review.  Given the narrow basis for the court’s decision in 
SandRidge, this Comment considers the application of the Liquid Audio 
standard to proxy puts in Part VI. 
Finally, the court framed its Unocal analysis as whether “the directors 
[complied] with their Unocal duties by identifying a circumstantially 
proper and non-pretextual basis for their actions[.]”137  According to the 
court, “[b]y smoking out the directors’ reasons, Unocal surfaces the issues 
at stake, including the possibility of bad faith.”138  In a footnote, the court 
reiterated the standard, stating, “the first prong of the Unocal test is 
‘designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a 
takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the 
corporation and its stockholders[;]’”139 and “a board that takes defensive 
measures in response to a hostile offer must show, under the first prong of 
the Unocal test, that ‘it determined in good faith [] that the [offer] 
presented a threat . . . that warranted a defensive response[.]’”140  
Importantly, the court made clear that its holding was based only on its 
analysis under Unocal’s first prong. 
C. The Court’s Analysis and Conclusion 
Based on the facts and the court’s view of the record, the court 
concluded, “the directors have failed to demonstrate a reasonable 
justification for their refusal to consider whether to approve the TPG slate 
for purposes of the good faith standard in Unocal.”141  In other words, the 
court held that the board’s decision to simply remain silent as to whether it 
approved of the rival slate for purposes of the Proxy Put was in bad faith.  
Accordingly, the court enjoined the board from soliciting consent 
revocations, voting any proxies it had received, and otherwise impeding 
TPG’s consent solicitation in any way until the board approved the TPG 
 
 136.  Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132 (emphasis original). 
 137.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259. 
 138.  Id. at 259. 
 139.  Id. at 259 n.90 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
 140.  Id. at 259 n.90 (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375). 
 141.  Id. at 259–60. 
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slate.142 
To reach its conclusion, the court relied heavily on its previous 
decision in Amylin.143  As detailed above, the court in Amylin interpreted 
similar change of control provisions and made clear that a board’s “only 
duty to the creditors [under the contracts] was to honor the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”144  The court in SandRidge read 
Amylin as holding that “the board could approve the new slate if ‘passing 
control would not constitute a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty to the 
corporation and its stockholders.’”145  In other words, “the duty of loyalty 
requires the incumbent board to exercise their contractual discretion with 
the best interests of SandRidge and its stockholders firmly in mind, to the 
extent that it can do so without breaching the very limited obligations it 
owes to its noteholders.”146 
This analysis is sufficient to reaching the court’s conclusion in 
SandRidge:  the board had made no determination that the rival slate posed 
a threat to the company, much less a good faith determination, and Amylin 
made it clear that the board had the contractual right to approve the rival 
slate.  Therefore, the board’s refusal to approve the rival slate was likely 
not motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation 
and its stockholders and was thereby in breach of its duty under Unocal’s 
first prong.  Yet the court continued its analysis and began to recharacterize 
Amylin as having been concerned with creditors’ legitimate interests in 
getting paid: 
Because, as Vice Chancellor Lamb also noted [in Amylin], the 
failure to approve a new slate might “impinge on the free 
exercise of the stockholder franchise,” and because a board that 
acts in good faith must seek to protect the stockholders’ ability to 
make an uncoerced choice of directors, it follows that a board 
may only fail to approve a dissident slate if the board determines 
that passing control to the slate would constitute a breach of the 
duty of loyalty, in particular, because the proposed slate poses a 
danger that the company would not honor its legal duty to repay 
its creditors.147 
This aspect of the court’s opinion in SandRidge broadens the court’s 
prior opinion in Amylin without justification.  And broadly characterizing 
Amylin has the effect of broadening the basis for the court’s holding in 
 
 142.  Id. at 247. 
 143.  Amylin, 983 A.2d at 304. 
 144.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 314–16). 
 145.  Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n. 37). 
 146.  Id. at 261. 
 147.  Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 319) (second emphasis added). 
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SandRidge.  To narrow SandRidge, this Comment attempts to scale back 
the court’s characterizations of Amylin therein. 
The court in Amylin did not discuss a company’s legal duty to repay 
its creditors.  Nevertheless, the court in SandRidge continued to 
recharacterize Amylin as such, stating, “this court in Amylin focused on the 
nature of the Proxy Put as a provision giving the creditors protection 
against a new board that would threaten their legitimate interests in getting 
paid.”148  Amylin did no such thing.  To the contrary, the Amylin court 
stated clearly in a footnote its view that “directors are under absolutely no 
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders in making this 
determination.”149  Then, the court in SandRidge listed three situations that 
would threaten creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid:  (1) “the 
proposed new board consists of ‘known looters[,]’” (2) “persons of suspect 
integrity[,]” or (3) “the insurgent slate could have plans for the company 
posing a genuine and specific threat to the corporation and its ability to 
honor its obligations to its creditors that prevent the incumbent board from 
approving them in good conscience for purposes of the Proxy Put.”150  
Regarding this third situation, the court recharacterized explicitly the 
Amylin court’s determination that “the directors are under absolutely no 
obligation to consider the interests of the noteholders” as having meant 
instead that “the directors are under no obligation to place any greater 
emphasis on the interests of the noteholders in making their decision as to 
the Proxy Put than as to any other decision that implicates the noteholders’ 
contractual rights.”151  To the contrary, Amylin made clear that a board’s 
good faith, informed judgment as to whether a change of control was not in 
the best interests of the company or its stockholders is independent from 
any subsequent determination of whether to approve the change of control 
for purposes of discharging its contractual duties—and even then the 
court’s analysis focused on the board’s power and rights under the contract 
and not the interests of its counterparty.152  At minimum, this portion of 
SandRidge characterizes Amylin as placing a greater emphasis on creditors’ 
interests, when in fact Amylin insisted that a board had no such duty. 
Between Amylin’s bifurcated approach and SandRidge’s 
 
 148.  Id. at 260 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 307 (“[C]onstrued in accordance with 
generally applied standards, the provision is properly understood to permit the incumbent 
directors to approve as a continuing director any person, whether nominated by the board or 
a stockholder, as long as the directors take such action in conformity with the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and in accordance with their normal fiduciary 
duties.”)). 
 149.  Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37 (emphasis original). 
 150.  SandRidge, 68 A.2d at 260. 
 151.  Id. at 260 n.95 (citing Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37). 
 152.  Amylin, 983 A.2d at 316 n.37. 
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recharacterization of Amylin as a unified approach, the bifurcated approach 
is the better of the two.  The board’s initial determination is binary—either 
the board believes in good faith that the change of control is a threat to the 
company and its stockholders or it does not—and has nothing to do with 
the counterparty’s interests under the contract.  If the board determines in 
good faith that the change of control is not a threat to the company and its 
stockholders, then the company has no duty to trigger a remedy under the 
contract.  The court stated as much in SandRidge.153  Alternatively, if the 
board determines in good faith that the change of control is a threat to the 
company and its stockholders, it is an exercise of bad faith to approve the 
change of control simply to avoid payment under the contract.154  The court 
reached this conclusion in Hills, not Amylin, and did so on a different 
record and under different circumstances.155 
As discussed previously, a critical distinction between Hills and 
Amylin is the record of the circumstances under which the respective 
companies agreed to the contracts containing the change of control 
provisions.  In Hills, the record demonstrated that the Hills board agreed to 
the severance packages precisely because it believed in good faith that the 
Dickstein Change of Control posed a threat of harm to Hills and its 
stockholders.156  Thus, its decision to trigger the promised remedy was 
reinforced by its belief that it had a contractual duty to trigger the 
bargained-for remedy under the exact circumstances contemplated by the 
contract.157  To the contrary, in Amylin there was no such record.  First, the 
 
 153.  See SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260 (“[W]here an incumbent board cannot identify that 
there is a specific and substantial risk to the corporation or its creditors posed by the rival 
slate, and approval of that slate would therefore not be a breach of the contractual duty of 
good faith owed to noteholders with the rights to the Proxy Put, the incumbent board must 
approve the new directors as a matter of its obligations to the company and its 
stockholders[] . . . .”). 
 154.  Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 109 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 155.  The court also reached this conclusion in SandRidge, but expressly included 
consideration of creditors’ rights in doing so: 
[W]here an incumbent board cannot identify that there is a specific and 
substantial risk to the corporation or its creditors posed by the rival slate, and 
approval of that slate would therefore not be a breach of the contractual duty of 
good faith owed to noteholders with the rights to the Proxy Put, the incumbent 
board must approve the new directors as a matter of its obligations to the 
company and its stockholders, even if it believes itself to be better qualified and 
have better plans for the corporation that the rival slate. 
SandRidge, 68 A.2d at 260–61. 
 156.  Hills, 769 A.2d at 101. 
 157.  Id. at 100–01.  “The outside directors felt that the company had a contractual 
obligation to the Covered Executives to trigger their right to Severance, unless the board 
believed in good faith that the Change in Control was not harmful to the company.”  Id. 
ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:22 PM 
2015] REGULATING PROXY PUTS 1339 
 
stockholder-plaintiff’s duty of care claim was based on the fact that the 
board failed to learn of the change of control provisions before agreeing to 
the Indenture.158  Second, the court held that whether the board had made 
an informed, good faith determination that the rival slate posed a threat to 
the company and its stockholders was unripe given the underdeveloped 
state of the record.159  A final distinction between Hills and Amylin is that, 
unlike in Hills (or even SandRidge), the central dispute in Amylin 
concerned the contractual rights and duties between the company and a 
creditor.160  Critically, the court in Amylin failed to emphasize or even 
recognize a contractual duty owed by the board to consider its creditors’ 
legitimate interests in getting paid pursuant to a change of control 
provision.  Thus, the court in SandRidge purports to find in Hills and 
Amylin an emphasis on creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid that 
simply are not there. 
As demonstrated, this broad characterization of proxy puts as giving 
creditors “protection against a new board that would threaten their 
legitimate interests in getting paid” appears throughout the court’s analysis 
in SandRidge.161  The effect is to imply a broad validation of proxy puts as 
an ordinary contractual device properly adopted both to protect a 
company’s creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid and to enable the 
company to defend against threats posing a danger to the company’s ability 
to honor its legal duty to repay its creditors.  Framed as such, the 
SandRidge court’s broad characterization of proxy puts appears reasonable.  
However, the court inadequately considers the cost of broadly validating a 
device that only accomplishes its intended purposes by either deterring 
stockholders from replacing an incumbent board or triggering enormous 
penalties against the company and its stockholders upon their electing to do 
so. 
Accordingly, this Part has attempted to narrow the SandRidge court’s 
broad characterizations of the Amylin case and suggest that the court’s 
broad characterizations of proxy puts enabled it to avoid reviewing both the 
proper purpose of the device and a board’s statutory authority to adopt the 
device.  However, the court’s attempt in SandRidge to narrow its own 
analysis by distinguishing its prior decision in the Hills case assists the 
furtherance of this Comment’s purpose. 
 
 158.  Amylin, 983 A.2d at 318. 
 159.  Id. at 317. 
 160.  Id. at 313. 
 161.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260. 
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D. Distinguishing the Hills Case 
Notwithstanding the court’s previous analysis as discussed at length 
above, SandRidge includes an informative discussion drawing sharp 
distinctions between this case and the Hills case.162  In particular, the court 
focused on (1) the nature of the contracts at issue in Hills compared to 
those at issue in SandRidge,163 and (2) the nature of the threats identified by 
the board in Hills compared to those (not) identified by the board in 
SandRidge.164 
The court points out that the severance agreements at issue in Hills 
“involve considerations that are distinct from credit agreements.”165  
Although both lenders and employees want to get paid, an employee’s 
“concerns about the identity of her boss [] are far more extensive, and 
legitimately so.”166  Elaborating, the court explains, 
A lender, such as the noteholders in this case, can protect itself 
by financial covenants, such as coverage and leverage ratios.  
The reality is that the debt, in this context, issued by the company 
is impersonal . . . .  An employee cannot protect herself against a 
fundamental shift in managerial approach, and has an obvious 
interest in knowing who her boss is.167 
The court objects to lumping different contracts including change of 
control provisions together, emphasizing that “the contractual obligation 
that the corporation owes to its contractual partner in exercising discretion 
to approve a change in control is [] influenced by the contractual 
expectations of that partner.”168  The court then distinguishes between 
changes of control under credit agreements:  “Critical for lenders are 
changes in control that directly affect capital structures in a way that could 
impair the lenders’ ability to get repaid, such as mergers or leveraged 
equity acquisitions.”169  Second, the court distinguishes the Hills case on 
the basis of the Hills board’s determination that the Dickstein Change of 
Control threatened the company’s fundamental ability to honor its legal 
obligations.170 
Nevertheless, the court fails to distinguish expressly the circumstances 
 
 162.  Id. at 261. 
 163.  Id. at 262. 
 164.  Id. at 263. 
 165.  Id. at 262. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 263. 
 170.  Id. 
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of the Hills case from its invocation in SandRidge of the legitimacy of a 
board’s determination that a rival slate’s plans pose a threat to the 
company’s ability to honor its obligations to its creditors.171  Even though 
the court uses qualifying phrases like “demonstrably material adverse 
effects”172 and “specific and substantial risk”173 throughout its opinion, it 
fails to characterize accurately the proper threat in SandRidge as 
bankruptcy.  Unlike SandRidge, Hills had recently emerged from 
bankruptcy and was already in financial distress; thus, the board 
determined that Dickstein’s proposal to take on enormous leverage 
threatened the ability of the company to continue as a going concern.174  
Although far narrower than the court’s characterization in SandRidge, the 
facts of Hills suggest proxy puts might be construed as narrowly as 
protecting creditors from a rival slate threatening to put the company in 
bankruptcy. 
III. UPDATE:  THE HEALTHWAYS CASE 
Recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a transcript ruling 
concerning a proxy put in Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. 
John Ballantine, et al. and Healthways, Inc.175  The relevant facts of 
Healthways arose in May 2012 when Healthways stockholders voted by an 
overwhelming margin to approve a precatory proposal to declassify the 
board over the board’s objections.176  Nearly eighteen months later, the 
board amended its articles of incorporation to phase out its classified 
structure.  Yet, immediately after the May 2012 proposal and long before 
its adoption in October 2013, the board entered into a fifth amended and 
restated revolving credit and term loan agreement.177  Unlike its 
predecessor, this agreement contained what the plaintiffs characterized as a 
“dead hand proxy put.”178  In 2013, Healthways issued additional debt 
without the “dead hand proxy put” provisions; but the new debt included 
cross-default provisions triggering default if the company defaulted on at 
 
 171.  See id., at 246, 260. 
 172.  Id. at 246. 
 173.  Id. at 260. 
 174.  Id. at 263. 
 175.  C.A. No. 9789-VCL, transcript (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Healthways 
Transcript] (on file with author). 
 176.  Healthways Transcript, at 69. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 70.  See also Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. John W. 
Ballantine, et al. and Healthways, Inc., C.A. No. 9789-VCL, redacted compl. (Del. Ch. June 
24, 2014), at 18 [hereinafter, Healthways Complaint](claiming the “dead hand proxy put” 
would cause enormous economic harm to the plaintiffs). 
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least $10 million of its other debt.179 
Stockholder pressure on the Healthways board continued.  The board 
rejected an 11% stockholder’s public demand to remove the CEO, but 
eventually resolved to grant the stockholder representation on the board in 
January 2014 after the stockholder threatened to wage a proxy fight.180  The 
“dead hand proxy put” provision at issue in Healthways operates 
identically to the one in the credit agreement appearing in Amylin.181  Thus, 
because the new directors assumed office as a result of a threatened proxy 
fight, they were not considered continuing directors for purposes of the 
“dead hand proxy put.”182  Before filing its complaint in Healthways, the 
plaintiff served the company with a books and records request under 
Section 220 “seeking documents and records relating to the dead hand 
proxy put.”183  However, according to the plaintiff, “the company failed to 
produce documents showing that there was substantive negotiation about 
the proxy put and no documents that suggested, to use the language of 
Amylin, that the company received ‘extraordinarily valuable economic 
benefits’ that might justify the proxy put.”184 
In Healthways, the plaintiff brought breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against the individual directors; a claim for aiding and abetting against 
SunTrust, the administrative agent for the bank group that extended the 
credit agreement to Healthways; and a declaratory judgment that the dead 
hand proxy put is unenforceable.185  The court denied a motion to dismiss 
by the individual directors and the company on ripeness grounds and a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state an aiding and abetting claim by 
SunTrust.  The court determined that the plaintiff’s claim was ripe due to 
two present injuries:  the deterrent effect of the proxy put and an ongoing 
Section 141(d) violation.186  In addition, the court determined that the 
plaintiff pled facts supporting the knowing participation requirement for 
aiding and abetting liability by demonstrating that SunTrust became “a 
party to an agreement containing an entrenching provision that creates a 
conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciaries on the other side of the 
negotiation” long after Amylin and SandRidge put parties on notice that the 
 
 179.  Healthways Transcript, at 70.  The cross-default provisions were included on 
issuances totaling $145 million in debt that would go into default if the company defaulted 
on any other loans in excess of $10 million. Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Compare Healthways Complaint, at 15, with Amylin, 983 A.2d at 309.  See also 
text accompanying note 78 (citing the credit agreement). 
 182.  Healthways Transcript, at 70–71. 
 183.  Id. at 71. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 72–74, 75. 
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proxy puts were questionable.187 
Healthways contributes two new bases for narrowing the court’s prior 
decisions in the previous three cases:  statutory claims under Section 141 
and an aiding and abetting claim.  The § 141(d) claim in Healthways takes 
its support from two cases considering poison pills.  In Carmody v. Toll 
Brothers, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled on a motion to 
dismiss that the “complaint states legally sufficient claims that the ‘dead 
hand’ provision of the Toll Brothers Rights Plan violates 8 Del. C. §§ 
141(a) and (d).”188  Because the statute requires restrictions on a board’s 
authority to manage the business and affairs of a corporation to be in the 
statute itself or the corporation’s certificate of incorporation and requires 
the creation of different classes of directors with unequal voting powers to 
be stated in the certificate of incorporation, the plain language of the “dead 
hand” provisions that restricts Continuing Directors’ authority to manage 
the company’s business and affairs and denies non-Continuing Directors 
equal voting power gives rise to cognizable statutory invalidity claims.189 
In addition, in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held invalid a “slow hand” poison pill because it 
“impermissibly circumscribes the board’s statutory power under Section 
141(a) and the directors’ ability to fulfill their concomitant fiduciary 
duties.”190  Importantly, the supreme court in Quickturn emphasized that 
“to the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a 
board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary 
duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.”191 
As to the aiding and abetting claim in Healthways, the court did not 
provide a detailed analysis, but noted merely that the court’s previous 
decisions in Amylin and SandRidge put the parties on notice that proxy puts 
were of questionable validity and recognized the conflict of interest 
 
 187.  Id. at 80–81. 
 188.  723 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. Ch. 1998).  In relevant part, Section 141(d) states: 
The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or series of stock the 
right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for such term, and have such voting powers 
as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation.  The terms of office and voting powers 
of the directors elected in the manner so provided in the certificate of incorporation may be 
greater than or less than those of any other director or class of directors. 
8 Del C. § 141(d).  In addition, Section 141(a) states, in relevant part: 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. 
8 Del. C. § 141(a). 
 189.  Id. at 1190–91. 
 190.  721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998). 
 191.  Id. at 1292 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994)). 
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between the company’s board and its stockholders created by the proxy 
put.192  Nevertheless, and even though Healthways is only a transcript 
ruling decided at the pleading stage, as of March 1, 2015, the firm 
representing the plaintiff who filed the complaint had successfully targeted 
and caused numerous other companies to remove “dead hand proxy puts” 
in their debt agreements.193 
The Healthways case narrows the court’s previous decisions in the 
following ways.  First, the Continuing Director provisions in the 
Employment Agreement at issue in Hills194 and the Credit Agreement 
appearing (though not directly at issue) in Amylin195 are subject to direct 
attack and review under the supreme court’s binding precedent in 
Quickturn and the chancery court’s persuasive precedent in Carmody.  
Given the similarity with which the Continuing Director provisions operate 
in the proxy put and poison put cases, it is difficult to imagine the court 
reaching a different conclusion in future proxy put cases.  Second, although 
the Indenture in Amylin196 and the Indenture in SandRidge197 do not operate 
by defining Continuing Directors directly, the provisions nevertheless 
operate by creating two classes of directors with unequal voting rights 
indirectly.  As before, it is difficult to imagine the court determining that 
these provisions are not invalid solely because they do not define 
Continuing Directors expressly.  Third, given the court’s now-
demonstrated willingness to recognize aiding and abetting claims against 
third-parties entering into agreements with these provisions, the proxy puts 
at issue in Hills, Amylin, SandRidge, and Healthways will probably be 
 
 192.  See Healthways Transcript at 79–80 (“There was ample precedent from this Court 
putting lenders on notice that these provisions were highly suspect and could potentially 
lead to a breach of duty on the part of the fiduciaries who were the counter-parties to a 
negotiation over the credit agreement.”). 
 193.  See, e.g., San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Stanzione, et al. and Arris 
Group Inc., C.A. No. 10078-VCG, proposed order & notice (Dec. 5, 2014) (“In this case, 
defendant Arris Group, Inc. . . . removed from a bank loan agreement the ‘continuing 
director’ provision which plaintiff alleged was invalid and a product of fiduciary duty 
breaches by the Company’s board of directors.”); Ironworkers Local No. 25 Pension Fund 
v. Donehy and Joy Global Inc., C.A. No. 10341-VCP, letter (Jan. 28, 2015) (“[N]ominal 
defendant Joy Global Inc. and defendant Bank of America, N.A. have eliminated the “Dead 
Hand Proxy Put” in the debt agreement that gave rise to this action.”); Ironworkers Local 
No. 25 Pension Fund v. Khoury, et al. and B/E Aerospace, Inc., C.A. No. 10342-VCN, letter 
(Dec. 24, 2014) (“[D]efendant B/E Aerospace, Inc. and defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. have terminated the Dead Hand Proxy Put and refinanced the debt under the debt 
agreement that is the subject of this action.”). 
 194.  See supra note 36 (citing the text of the Continuing Director provision). 
 195.  See supra text accompanying note 78 (citing the text of the Continuing Director 
provision). 
 196.  See supra text accompanying note 77 (citing the text of the Indenture). 
 197.  See supra note 106 (citing the text of the Indenture). 
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amended or eliminated.198 
However, none of this is to say that the court’s ruling in Healthways 
(i.e., the plaintiffs there merely stated a legally cognizable claim) will have 
the effect of eliminating proxy puts entirely.  It is more likely that 
contracting parties will instead draft and adopt proxy puts that trigger upon 
the unapproved stockholder election of a new board majority where all 
directors have equal voting power.  Including delay provisions risks 
running afoul of Quickturn’s invalidation of “slow hand” poison pills, but 
parties still may implement provisions requiring approval by a 
supermajority vote. 
Accordingly, following this Comment’s attempt to narrow Delaware’s 
cases interpreting proxy puts and the likelihood that the court’s recent 
decision in Healthways will fundamentally affect the nature of proxy puts 
in the market, there is ample room to consider how Delaware should 
regulate proxy puts in the future. 
IV. RECHARACTERIZING PROXY PUTS 
This Part considers how to regulate proxy puts by exploring the 
device’s components and operation.199  Then, this Part questions the limited 
extent to which proxy puts provide unique protection to creditors and 
proposes narrowing the proper purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk as a 
concern distinct from Event Risk. 
A. Understanding the Components and Operation of Proxy Puts 
As an initial matter, it must be noted that change of control covenants 
are not the only covenants protecting lenders.  Debt covenants cover a wide 
range of circumstances and can be divided into several categories: 
restrictions on the firm’s production/investment policy (including 
restrictions on disposition of assets); restrictions on distributions 
(including restrictions on the payment of dividends, share 
purchases, and other forms of distribution); restrictions on 
 
 198.  See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 199.  For an argument that “embedded” change of control provisions like proxy puts in 
bond indentures are unregulable, see Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Precommitment and 
Managerial Incentives: Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 577, 602 (2003) (“[I]t is also neither desirable nor feasible to regulate such 
defenses by allowing shareholders or courts (or both) to decide their fate ex post, once a 
tender offer has emerged.”).  However, as Amylin and SandRidge demonstrate, it is well 
within the expertise of Delaware courts to regulate board decisions made in the ordinary 
course of business that have an entrenching effect or touch on issues of control. 
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subsequent financing (including limitations on issuing higher-
priority debt and guarantees); modification of payoffs (including 
sinking funds, conversion rights, and callability); and bonding 
activities (including required reports, specification of accounting 
standards, and officer certificates of compliance).200 
However, as exemplified by the RJR Nabisco buyout discussed below, 
traditional covenants alone proved inadequate to protecting lenders from 
certain changes of control.  An early generation of change of control 
covenants, characterized as “poison puts” because they were intended to 
make the company “indigestible for a hostile bidder”, triggered upon a 
change of control not approved by the board of directors.201  But because 
these covenants failed to protect against management-friendly transactions, 
such as the RJR Nabisco buyout, a second generation of more 
comprehensive “super poison puts” emerged,202 including limitations on 
beneficial ownership, stock repurchases and special dividends, the transfer 
or lease of assets, certain mergers or acquisitions, and significant changes 
in board composition.203  The last of these most closely captures the proxy 
puts that are the subject of this Comment. 
To better understand the operation and impact of proxy puts, this 
Comment turns to the scholarship of Professors Kahan and Klausner.  In 
Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management 
Entrenchment?, Kahan and Klausner examined the development of change 
of control covenants protecting bondholders in the wake of the 1988 RJR 
Nabisco buyout.204  Despite the variety of covenants already protecting 
bondholders in the event of certain changes in control, the buyout 
announcement caused RJR Nabisco bondholders to suffer catastrophic 
losses because the protections did not include management buyouts or 
friendly mergers.205  As a result, lenders and corporations expanded the 
scope of the change of control covenants protecting bondholders from 
takeover-related losses.  However, the expanded change of control 
covenants also functioned as antitakeover measures that protected 
 
 200.  See Rock, supra note 26, at 1930 (citing Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, 
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 
(1979)). 
 201.  F. John Stark et al., “Marriott Risk”: A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers 
of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 503, 568 (1994). 
 202.  Id. at 569. 
 203.  Id. at 573. 
 204.  Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder 
Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1992/1993). 
 205.  See id. at 980 (discussing the narrow change of control covenants in substantially 
all bonds issued prior to the RJR Nabisco buyout). 
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management at the expense of stockholders.206  Given the mixed efficiency 
of these devices, Kahan and Klausner examined whether change of control 
covenants in bond indentures enhance firm value and the potential for 
management to use these provisions for entrenchment purposes.  This 
Comment relies on Kahan and Klausner’s description of how change of 
control provisions operate and affect a firm’s agency costs of debt and 
equity rather than the results of their empirical analysis. 
Kahan and Klausner discussed two issues critical to understanding 
proxy puts:  a corporation’s agency costs of debt and equity, and the 
triggers and remedies that define the way change of control covenants 
operate.  First, the authors situated change of control covenants in Jensen 
and Meckling’s agency cost framework.207  There, a corporation’s agency 
cost of debt “is a product of the conflicting interests of stockholders and 
bondholders once bonds have been issued.”208  More specifically, risk-
averse bondholders prefer the corporation to pursue a conservative business 
strategy to maximize the likelihood of paying off its debt; in contrast, 
stockholders prefer the corporation to pursue a riskier strategy to maximize 
the unlimited gains on their investment.  Thus, agency costs arise from the 
“incentives for a company to engage in transactions that lower the value of 
the firm but nevertheless increase shareholder wealth by shifting wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders.”209 
Importantly, these transactions include the debt-financed acquisitions 
or leveraged recapitalizations that surround takeover-related activity.  
When a company takes on high levels of debt, existing bondholders “bear a 
large part of the company’s [increased] risk of failure, but . . . receive no 
additional benefit if the company succeeds.”210  As a result, new 
bondholders incorporate the risk of this additional leverage into the cost of 
the company’s debt by either requiring higher interest rates or including 
certain other restrictive covenants.  To the extent that higher interest rates 
fully compensate bondholders ex ante for the risk of harm flowing from 
increased leverage associated with certain changes in control, bondholders 
are indifferent as to whether a change occurs.  However, since a higher cost 
of debt decreases the value of the company, companies face an incentive to 
 
 206.  See id. at 934–35 (discussing the differing view that the change of control 
covenants are designed and implemented by management without shareholder approval to 
protect management from hostile takeovers). 
 207.  Id. at 938 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333–43 
(1976)). 
 208.  Id. at 938. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 939. 
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give up their right to engage in takeover-related activities associated with 
higher leverage by entering into restrictive, protective covenants in 
exchange for debt with lower interest rates.  The authors state, “So long as 
bondholders are paid interest rates that reflect the presence or absence of 
covenant protection, they are indifferent to the extent of protection they are 
given.”211 
Kahan and Klausner also examined the impact of change of control 
covenants on a company’s agency cost of equity.  Agency costs of equity 
arise from the conflict between stockholders’ sole interest in maximizing 
the value of their shares and the personal interests of management to retain 
control of the company.212  Generally, the market for corporate control 
decreases a company’s agency cost of equity by both disciplining managers 
to act in the best interest of stockholders by maximizing share value, and 
replacing managers who fail to do so through hostile takeovers and proxy 
contests.213  However, the market for corporate control primarily consists of 
the same takeover-related, leverage-increasing events as those covered by 
the change of control provisions protecting bondholders.  Accordingly, 
change of control covenants that protect not only bondholder interests but 
also managements’ interests represent a trade-off between decreasing 
agency costs of debt and increasing agency costs of equity.214  Kahan and 
Klausner contrasted the boundaries of this trade-off as follows: 
the bondholder-protective covenant that minimizes the agency 
cost of debt and equity would cover all leveraged acquisitions 
and recapitalizations and would provide compensation for no 
more than the actual loss in bond values that occurs as a result of 
the transaction.  The ideal management-protective covenant, in 
contrast, would cover only hostile acquisitions and proxy 
challenges, and it would provide for a supra-compensatory 
remedy in the event that either of these control changes occurs.  
This covenant would both increase the firm’s agency cost of 
equity and fail to achieve potential reductions in the agency cost 
 
 211.  Id. at 939.  See also Rock, supra note 26, at 1932 (“At issuance, many studies find 
a negative relationship between the ex ante pricing of debt and the presence of covenants.”) 
(citing Vidhan K Goyal, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Evidence From Subordinated 
Debt Contracts, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 318, 334 (2005)); Natalia Reisel, On the Value 
of Restrictive Covenants: An Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues 5–7 (Dec. 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-644522). 
 212.  Id. at 944 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327–28 
(1976)). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
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of debt.215 
Importantly, Kahan and Klausner noted that, because bondholders are 
indifferent to changes in control when interest rates reflect the presence or 
absence of protection, “[t]he underlying conflict regarding the terms of a 
change of control covenant is thus the familiar one between managers and 
shareholders.”216  Thus, managers draft change of control covenants to 
benefit themselves in the following ways.  First, managers who draft 
covenants that fail to protect bondholders from harmful, management-
favored transactions (like management buyouts or leveraged 
recapitalizations) fail to efficiently reduce the company’s agency cost of 
debt.217  Since bondholders protect themselves by requiring higher interest 
rates to account for the additional risk of harmful, management-favored 
transactions, stockholders ultimately carry this additional cost through 
higher costs of borrowing.  Second, managers draft covenants to 
compensate bondholders for takeover-related events that cause no harm 
whatsoever, but nevertheless threaten management’s interests and control 
of the company.218  Finally, managers draft covenants to significantly 
overcompensate bondholders for certain disfavored transactions in order to 
deter takeover-related events that threaten their job security.219 
The second issue critical to understanding proxy puts is the terms that 
define change of control covenants generally.  Change of control covenants 
consist of a trigger and a remedy.  Kahan and Klausner divided change of 
control covenants into the following categories:  Hostile Control Change 
Covenants, Dual Trigger Covenants, and Pure Rating Decline Covenants.220  
Additionally, the authors observed two remedies:  the right to put debt back 
to the company at par or at a premium and an adjustment on the interest 
rate payable to the bondholder.221 
Hostile Control Change Covenants are triggered by one of two 
takeover-related events:  an unapproved acquisition of a specified 
percentage of the company’s shares; or an unapproved proxy challenge 
replacing a majority of the company’s directors.222  In both cases, approval 
typically can be given “by the directors in office at the time the bonds were 
 
 215.  Id. at 950. 
 216.  Id. at 948. 
 217.  Id. at 949. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 950. 
 220.  Id. at 951. 
 221.  Id. at 960. 
 222.  Id. at 952–53.  Although not described as such by Kahan and Klausner, an 
unapproved proxy challenge replacing a majority of the company’s directors is a Proxy Put. 
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issued or successors they have chosen . . . .”223  Because these covenants 
only apply to transactions not approved by management and omit 
management-favored, leveraged recapitalizations, “[t]he scope of 
bondholder protection is thus narrowly limited to hostile acquisitions and 
proxy challenges, the two ways in which stockholders can wrest control 
from management.”224  When triggered, Hostile Control Change Covenants 
typically provide the right to put the debt back to the company at par or at a 
premium.225  However, this remedy does not compensate bondholders for 
harm arising from the triggering event:  if market interest rates had 
declined enough prior to the event, the put would undercompensate a 
bondholder; alternatively, if market interest rates had increased enough 
prior to the event, the put would overcompensate a bondholder.226  In either 
case, intervening market events, not bondholder protection against harm 
arising from an unapproved acquisition of shares or a proxy challenge, will 
largely determine the size of the remedy triggered by a Hostile Control 
Change Covenant.  Thus, despite the stated intent, Hostile Control Change 
Covenants appear to protect directors more from the market for corporate 
control than bondholders from harm arising from hostile changes of 
control. 
Dual Trigger Covenants, on the other hand, are triggered only when a 
decline in a bond’s credit rating227 accompanies one of the following 
events:  (1) the acquisition of a specified percentage of the company’s 
stock; (2) a successful proxy challenge replacing a majority of an 
incumbent board by individuals not nominated by management; (3) a 
merger, consolidation, or sale of substantially all of the corporation’s 
assets; or (4) the payment of dividends or the repurchase of shares 
exceeding a specified percentage of the company’s equity, or both, over the 
course of one year.228  Kahan and Klausner found that most Dual Trigger 
 
 223.  Id. at 952. 
 224.  Id. at 954. 
 225.  Id. at 960. 
 226.  Id. at 963.  Kahan and Klausner further explain the managerial interests reflected 
by including puts in change of control covenants, stating: 
This skewing of compensation under a put at par is particularly evident in the 
case of a proxy challenge or a hostile acquisition by a financially strong 
acquirer – two transactions that are unlikely to reduce bond values substantially, 
if at all.  Because bondholders rarely suffer losses as a result of these 
transactions, the predominant potential impact of a put at par is to provide 
overcompensation (that is, if market rates have risen). 
Id. at 965. 
 227.  Id. at 955–56.  To contribute to a trigger, a bond’s rating must fall either from 
investment grade or a full rating category.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 955.  Kahan and Klausner note that sometimes a successful proxy challenge 
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Covenants included a put at par, although some included an interest rate 
adjustment determined by a schedule in the covenant relating specific 
interest rates to changes in credit ratings.229  According to Kahan and 
Klausner, because Dual Trigger Covenants protect against most takeover-
related events, they “offer substantially more complete coverage to 
bondholders than do Hostile Control Change Covenants.”230  Also, even 
though the put remedy is less efficient than the interest rate adjustment, 
Dual Trigger Covenants “relate the availability of a remedy more closely to 
transactions that actually cause a reduction in bond values[.]”231  
Nevertheless, these covenants still reflect managerial interests by including 
proxy contests, which alone merely remove management and cause little 
harm to bondholders.232 
Finally, Pure Rating Decline Covenants automatically adjust the 
interest rate payable to bondholders upon an increase or decrease in the 
bond’s credit rating, regardless of whether the change corresponds with a 
takeover-related event.233  Pure Rating Decline Covenants “contain the 
most direct link between the remedy and losses in bond values” and reflect 
no influence of management interests.234  However, they also “impose on a 
corporation the risk of credit quality deterioration that is completely outside 
the control of corporate management, such as problems attributable to 
increased competition.”235  Kahan and Klausner suggest these covenants are 
rare because they create management inflexibility that is adverse to both 
stockholders and bondholders.236 
Kahan and Klausner’s analysis of antitakeover provisions in bonds 
illustrates two issues critical to understanding proxy puts.  First, the agency 
cost of debt arising from takeover-related transactions provides 
opportunities for companies to reduce their cost of debt and increase 
stockholder value by utilizing change of control covenants.  However, 
because change of control covenants concern management’s exposure to 
the market for corporate control, managers are incentivized to draft these 
covenants in their best interest rather than in the company’s best interest, 
resulting in both a failure to decrease their company’s agency cost of debt 
 
replacing a majority of the incumbent board is not included in a Dual Trigger Covenant, and 
sometimes a major asset acquisition by the company is included. 
 229.  Id. at 961. 
 230.  Id. at 956. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 957. 
 233.  Id. at 958–59. 
 234.  Id. at 959. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 960. 
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and ultimately an increase in their company’s agency cost of equity.237  
Second, managers draft change of control provisions to benefit their 
interests and harm stockholders in several ways.  In particular, managers 
design triggers to protect against changes of control that are not likely to 
harm bondholders, like successful proxy challenges, and to exclude 
management-favored transactions that will harm bondholders.  To deter 
unfriendly changes of control, managers also design remedies that either 
compensate bondholders who have not been harmed or overcompensate 
bondholders for harm actually suffered. 
Importantly, the price of bonds reflects the extent of protective 
covenants.238  In other words, a bondholder seeks to make themselves 
indifferent between either receiving lower interest rates ex ante and a 
remedy equal to harm suffered in the event of a triggering change of 
control or receiving higher interest rates ex ante with no remedy in the 
event of a change of control.  Thus, while bondholders might receive a 
windfall from an overbroad or overcompensatory provision, there is little 
reason to assume a bondholder would accept a lower interest rate ex ante in 
exchange for the mere chance at a windfall remedy—and no reason to 
assume a bondholder would accept a lower interest rate ex ante in exchange 
for a provision that fails to protect against other genuinely harmful takeover 
events. 
Kahan and Klausner’s analysis leaves the benefit of proxy puts to 
agency costs of debt and equity, and thus to stockholders, on narrow 
ground.  Without an accompanying decline in credit rating, proxy puts are 
Hostile Control Change Covenants.  When proxy puts are included in debt 
agreements, successful proxy challenges trigger proxy puts and provide 
debt holders the remedy of putting their debt back to the company.  But as 
 
 237.  See supra text accompanying note 215 (illustrating the poor incentive structures 
that lead managers to draft covenants in their own best interests as opposed to the 
company’s best interest). 
 238.  Id. at 939 (arguing that “So long as bondholders are paid interest rates that reflect 
the presence or absence of covenant protection, they are indifferent to the extent of 
protection they are given.”); see also, Rock, supra note 26 at 1932 (stating “(1) creditor 
protection is associated with lower promised yields at issue; and (2) there is a significant 
negative relation between credit spreads and the degree of covenant protection, controlling 
for issuer and bond issue characteristics”) (citing Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection, 
Credit Spread Dynamics and Managerial Incentives 13–18 (Nov. 29, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/JobMarket_CovenantsSpreadCEOIncentive_ChenyangWei
.pdf); Rock, supra note 26 at 1934 (citing Matthew T. Billet, Zhan Jiang & Erik Lie, The 
Effect of Change-in-Control Covenants on Takeovers: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts, 
16 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 6 tbl.2, 11 (2010) (providing evidence that in the 2000s, change of 
control covenants used in 41% of bonds were associated with gains to bondholders of 2.3% 
compared to losses to bondholders of 6.8% in bonds without change of control covenants). 
ARTICLE 6 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:22 PM 
2015] REGULATING PROXY PUTS 1353 
 
Kahan and Klausner point out, successful proxy challenges alone pose little 
threat to debt holders for which they would require protection.239  Instead, 
the larger risk to debt holders associated with successful proxy challenges 
arises from the newly elected board’s later decision to engage in debt-
financed or takeover-related activity.  But since proxy puts do not provide 
debt holders with direct protection from harm arising from leverage-
increasing events subsequent to successful proxy challenges, debt holders 
protect themselves from these events with higher interest rates or other 
restrictive covenants.240 
By implication, because debt holders benefit only marginally, if at all, 
from additional takeover-related protection in proxy puts, it is unlikely that 
companies derive substantial benefits from granting them.241  In this 
respect, stockholders do not benefit from proxy puts because proxy puts 
exact a toll on stockholders’ voting rights without a corresponding decrease 
in the company’s cost of borrowing and agency cost of debt.  Furthermore, 
by providing an overcompensatory put remedy, proxy puts tend to shield 
managers from the market for corporate control and thereby increase the 
company’s agency cost of equity.  It is evident that entrenchment may be 
the primary purpose of proxy puts. 
To better illustrate how limited the protective value of a proxy put is 
to a lender, compare two extremes:  debt protected only by a proxy put and 
no other covenants; and debt protected by a wide range of protective 
covenants but no proxy put.  First, in the absence of additional protective 
covenants, a proxy put provides no creditor protection from nearly any 
action the incumbent board could take, including engaging in management-
 
 239.  Id. at 950.  This is explained by Kahan and Klausner’s observation that 
bondholders will protect themselves by pricing any unprotected risk of harm into the interest 
rate on bonds.  Id. at 939.  Because proxy puts do not provide bondholders with additional 
protection from takeover-related events, bondholders have no incentive to reduce the 
interest rate.  Thus, broad proxy puts tend to benefit bondholders at the expense of 
stockholders.  Instead, the benefit flows to management by shielding them from the market 
for corporate control.  Id. at 949. 
 240.  In fact, the RJR Nabisco buyout itself illustrates the risk of harm to bondholders 
that Hostile Control Change Covenants (like proxy puts) leave unprotected: because the RJR 
Nabisco buyout resulted from a bidding war between a highly-leveraged management-led 
buyout and a highly-leveraged friendly acquisition, neither non-hostile buyout triggered a 
bondholder-protective remedy.  Similarly, a proxy put alone would not compensate 
bondholders for harm suffered if incumbent management themselves decided to leverage the 
company and buy back shares or distribute a cash dividend to defend against a proxy 
challenge. 
 241.  Debt holders undoubtedly benefit when proxy puts compensate them despite a lack 
of harm.  See supra, text accompanying note 213.  However, this benefit is an unbargained-
for windfall to the debt holder representing a direct transfer of wealth from stockholders to 
bondholders. 
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friendly changes of control.  For example, the board could dilute the value 
of the creditor’s fixed claim on the assets of the company by spinning off a 
subsidiary or distributing assets to shareholders or by substituting more 
risky assets for less risky assets; alternatively, the board could decide to 
change the capital structure of the company by increasing leverage.242  
Given that this list likely includes nearly everything that could happen in 
the life of a company, other than the shareholders choosing to elect a new 
board majority without the incumbent board’s approval, the creditor faces 
an enormous risk of harm that the proxy put cannot prevent.  By way of 
analogy, a proxy put protects creditors from harm to the same extent the 
front door insulates a home from the cold:  it doesn’t matter how tightly 
you bolt it shut if all the other doors and windows are left open.  It is 
difficult to imagine a creditor conferring a material benefit on a company in 
exchange for this kind of protection. 
In the alternative, consider a creditor that is concerned about its 
borrower dramatically changing its capital structure, significantly diluting 
its assets, taking too many risks, or becoming the target of a leveraged buy-
out.  Instead of a proxy put, this creditor negotiated with its borrower for 
covenants restricting its ability to materially change its capital structure by 
increasing leverage, decreasing equity, spinning-off or selling all or 
substantially all of its assets, and for protection against both a credit rating 
downgrade and the company reporting an interest coverage ratio below a 
negotiated threshold.  By design, the creditor is protected from just about 
any foreseeable event that would materially reduce the likelihood that its 
borrower will repay its debt.  In addition, the borrower was able to obtain a 
lower interest rate as consideration for agreeing to the covenants protecting 
the lender; thus, both parties benefit from the covenant.  However, seeking 
to refinance its debt with the creditor, presumably for the purpose of further 
reducing its cost of borrowing, the company proposes to add the only 
protection the creditor doesn’t already have:  a proxy put.  How would the 
proxy put increase the creditor’s protection from harm?  Any new board 
majority would be just as subject to the creditor’s existing protection as the 
incumbent board is.  As such, the creditor is already protected from any 
material increase in the risk that the company would not be able to repay its 
debt arising from stockholders electing a new board majority. 
This hypothetical is not meant to reflect current market trends, but 
rather that the amount of protection uniquely provided by proxy puts is 
limited, notwithstanding the Delaware Court of Chancery’s analysis in 
SandRidge.  Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that lenders in fact 
 
 242.  See Rock, supra note 26, at 1927 (describing how shareholders externalize risk 
onto creditors and other fixed claimants). 
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place no value on proxy puts.243  The next section of this Comment 
proposes a distinction designed to enable Delaware to better regulate proxy 
puts. 
B. Distinguishing Identity Risk From Event Risk 
The “proxy put” label can be characterized broadly or narrowly.  
Under the court’s broad characterization of proxy puts in SandRidge, the 
“proxy” label most accurately captures the device’s duplicative function as 
a distant proxy for protection against multiple possible harms arising from 
leverage-increasing or takeover-related events taking place after 
stockholders elect a new board majority by directly and substantially 
interfering with the shareholder franchise itself.  Instead, the “proxy put” 
label could be narrowly characterized as a description of the device’s 
operative provisions and an honest recognition of its purpose of protecting 
against unique risks arising from proxy fights.  Adopting a narrow 
characterization, as this Comment proposes, suggests the clearest answer to 
whether a board has the authority to bind the corporation to a change of 
control provision designed to prevent stockholders from electing a new 
board of directors:  as the court held in Blasius, a board has no such 
authority absent a compelling justification.244  Because the limited 
protection that a proxy put uniquely provides contrasts with the potentially 
unlimited cost of the device to the stockholder franchise, this Comment 
proposes defining the proper purpose of proxy puts to be as narrow as the 
limited protection that a proxy put uniquely provides.  More precisely, this 
Comment proposes (1) defining the proper purpose of proxy puts to be 
providing protection against Identity Risk and (2) attaching a rebuttable 
presumption that proxy puts are disenfranchising. 
Kahan and Klausner define “Event Risk” as “the risk that an event 
will occur that results in a sudden change in a corporation’s credit quality 
 
 243.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Fields, David S. Kidwell & Linda S. Klein, Coupon Resets 
Versus Poison Puts: The Valuation of Event Risk Provisions in Corporate Debt, 3 FIN. 
SERV. REV. 143 (1994); Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders 
and “Super Poison Put” Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689 (1991) (attributing 24 basis points 
in value primarily to a change in beneficial ownership and a credit rating decline); MOODY’S 
REP. NO. 98985, REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON MOODY’S INDENTURE COVENANT RESEARCH & 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (2006) (omitting proxy puts as a relevant or valuable form of 
creditor protection); Moody’s Rep. No. 108526, CREDIT ROUNDTABLE ADOPTS A CONTRACT-
BASED APPROACH TO MITIGATING RISK, (2008), at 5 n. 15 (describing proxy puts as 
“[d]esigned to address hostile takeovers, this ‘event’ prong is not particularly useful.”).  
These reports are in stark contrast to the court’s consistent characterization of proxy puts in 
SandRidge as protecting creditors’ legitimate interests in getting paid. 
 244.  Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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but that cannot be predicted using the tools of credit analysis.”245  This 
definition “includes not only financial transactions such as leveraged 
buyouts, spin-offs and restructurings but also a variety of other 
extraordinary events such as major litigations, casualty losses and the 
like.”246  For present purposes, Event Risk might as well be defined so 
broadly that it includes the risk that any event will occur resulting in a 
sudden change in a corporation’s credit quality.  The only thing that Event 
Risk should not include is Identity Risk. 
As defined here, Identity Risk arises from proxy fights, but contrasts 
with Event Risk in that it is not concerned with what legitimate actions a 
newly elected board majority might take.  It is instead narrowly concerned 
with risks related to the identity of the individuals in question.247  By way 
of example, the court in SandRidge identified several risks to creditors 
posed by a rival proxy slate:  “the proposed new board consists of ‘known 
looters’ or persons of suspect integrity[;]” or “the insurgent slate could 
have plans for the company posing a genuine and specific threat to the 
corporation[.]”248  Although Event Risk likely encompasses “plans for the 
company,” Identity Risk carves out the risk of harm arising from 
stockholders electing a new board majority consisting of “known looters” 
or persons of suspect integrity.249 
Distinguishing Identity Risk from Event Risk is consistent with 
Delaware law.  In Delaware, the stockholders of a corporation elect its 
directors.250  According to Blasius, this continues to be true even when a 
rival slate’s “proposal was or is unrealistic and would lead to injury to the 
corporation and its shareholders if pursued.”251  Critically, the court 
clarified that while it may be true that “the board knows better than do the 
shareholders what is in the corporation’s best interest[] . . . for any number 
of matters, it is irrelevant . . . when the question is who should comprise the 
board of directors.”252  Thus, notwithstanding the Event Risk posed by a 
rival slate’s proposal, a board may not interfere with the shareholder 
franchise without a compelling justification.253  Even without the proposed 
 
 245.  See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 204, at 934 n.5 (defining “event risk”). 
 246.  See Stark et al., supra note 201 (describing a broad definition of “event risk”). 
 247.  For the avoidance of doubt, Identity Risk is concerned with the identity of 
nominees on a rival slate, not the stockholder nominating the rival slate. 
 248.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 260. 
 249.   The substance of this proposed definition is intentionally limited to one of the 
strongest justifications for interfering with the stockholder franchise, but experience will no 
doubt permit the definition to expand. 
 250.  8 Del. C. § 211(b). 
 251.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663. 
 252.  Id. at 663. 
 253.  Id. at 659. 
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presumption that proxy puts are disenfranchising, a broadly framed proxy 
put characterized as being concerned with Event Risk is arguably 
disenfranchising on its face, notwithstanding the chancery court’s prior 
decisions to the contrary.254  By contrast, a proxy put concerned only with 
Identity Risk, that is, the narrow risk of harm arising from a new board 
majority consisting of known looters or persons of suspect integrity, 
arguably satisfies Blasius’s compelling justification standard with ease.  
Because of this, attaching a disenfranchising presumption is both consistent 
with Blasius and easily rebutted by a board defending a narrow proxy put. 
In addition to being consistent with Delaware law, separating Identity 
Risk from Event Risk as the proper purpose of proxy puts is useful in 
several ways.  First, it provides a clear signal to the market that the court is 
willing to presume a proxy put is disenfranchising on its face.  This will put 
boards on notice that they will have to demonstrate a compelling 
justification for triggering proxy puts in order to satisfy their fiduciary 
duties.  Plus, the threat of being subject to compelling justification review 
will incentivize boards to amend the proxy puts to which their company is a 
party in order to decrease the extent to which they are concerned with 
Identity Risk.  For example, a dual trigger covenant providing a creditor 
with an interest rate adjustment remedy upon the reduction in the credit 
rating of its borrower shortly after a change in board majority is arguably 
more concerned with the credit rating Event Risk than the proxy fight risk 
and thus not likely to reviewed under Blasius.  This contrasts with a 
provision that automatically triggers a put remedy above par upon the 
election of an unapproved new board majority, which would probably be a 
facially invalid abdication of a board’s fiduciary duties or, at minimum, 
subject to Blasius review in all circumstances.  Thus, the threat of being 
subjected to compelling justification review will encourage directors to 
focus change of control provisions on the best interests of the company and 
its stockholders instead of their own. 
Second, separating Identity Risk from Event Risk will provide clarity 
not only as to the proper standard of review for proxy puts, but also as to 
the proper standard of review for broader change of control covenants.  
Even though the court has reviewed proxy puts under Unocal “with a 
 
 254.  See, e.g., Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The 
plaintiffs are estopped from arguing and have produced no evidence that the Employment 
Areements were entered into for the ‘primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of a 
stockholder vote.’”); Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“But the standard of review Blasius offers does little to address situations like this, where a 
contractual provision cannot be said to have the ‘sole or primary purpose’ of impeding the 
stockholders’ vote . . . .”). 
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special sensitivity towards the stockholder franchise[,]”255 the simple fact is 
that Blasius and Liquid Audio still create ambiguity as to when the court 
might adopt a higher standard.  Thus, carving out Identity Risk would 
increase clarity as to the circumstances under which the court will conduct 
a compelling justification review. 
Third, despite limiting the proper purpose of certain proxy puts, the 
proposed distinction is not a per se invalidation of the device.  This is 
consistent with Delaware’s preference against per se rules.256 
Finally, juxtaposing Identity Risk and Event Risk will focus both the 
court and boards of directors on a more thorough consideration of the broad 
contractual context in which proxy puts appear.  For example, a board 
determining for purposes of a proxy put whether to approve a rival slate 
planning to conduct a leveraged share repurchase like in Hills might 
reasonably choose not to do so because the creditor is better protected by a 
covenant restricting the rival slate’s ability either to change the company’s 
capital structure after its election or to repurchase a substantial amount of 
shares.  And because neither party expected the proxy put to protect from 
leveraged share repurchases, declining to trigger the remedy would not be a 
breach of the proxy put. 
V. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK OF REVIEW FOR PROXY PUTS 
In Hills, Amylin, SandRidge, and Healthways, Delaware began laying 
the foundation for a framework of review, but more work is necessary to 
achieve clarity and utility in future cases concerning proxy puts.  This 
Comment set out to address two primary questions left unanswered in 
SandRidge by narrowing the court’s characterizations of both Amylin and 
proxy puts.  After exploring the components and agency costs of change of 
control provisions, this Comment questioned the extent to which proxy puts 
add unique protection to creditors and proposed narrowing the proper 
purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk as a concern distinct from Event 
Risk.  In this Part, this Comment develops the structure of a framework of 
review assuming Identity Risk is the proper purpose of proxy puts with the 
goal of exploring the extent to which the framework provides a means to 
regulating shareholder-creditor agency costs related to proxy puts. 
Distinguishing Identity Risk from Event Risk parallels distinguishing 
Blasius from Unocal:  as the court recognized in Blasius, it is irrelevant 
 
 255.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259. 
 256.  See, e.g., In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, transcript 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (“Per se rulings where judges invalidate contractual provisions 
across the bar are exceedingly rare in Delaware, and they should be.”). 
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whether a board’s actions are proportionate to a threat conceived in good 
faith when it comes to deciding who should comprise the board of 
directors.  And the supreme court was just as clear in Liquid Audio when it 
held that demonstrating a compelling justification for action taken with the 
primary purpose of interfering with a stockholder election is a condition 
precedent to any determination of the action’s reasonableness.257  Yes, 
actions taken to protect against Identity Risk are by their nature defensive; 
but because protecting against that risk requires interfering with the 
stockholder franchise, the primary purpose of those defensive actions is 
presumptively disenfranchising.  By implication, then, distinguishing 
Identity Risk from Event Risk attaches the presumption of a primary 
purpose to disenfranchise and suggests some form of compelling 
justification review.  Therefore, this Comment adopts the Liquid Audio 
standard of review for proxy puts as a means to considering both the 
disenfranchising presumption and the proportionality of a board’s actions 
in relation to Identity Risk. 
As will be shown, incorporating Identity Risk into a Liquid Audio 
standard of review simplifies the analysis of proxy puts by focusing 
narrowly on whether a proxy put was adopted to protect against Identity 
Risk, whether its trigger is limited to protecting against Identity Risk, and 
whether the board demonstrates a good faith belief informed by compelling 
evidence that a rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity Risk before 
triggering the device.  Within this framework, the validity of a board’s 
decisions to adopt and exercise a proxy put has a firm basis in Delaware 
corporate law, both in terms of the board’s authority to adopt the device 
and the proportionality of the device’s trade-off between the stockholders’, 
creditors’, and company’s interests under the circumstances.  Finally, 
creditors also benefit from the framework’s clear demarcation of a board’s 
authority to adopt and exercise proxy puts. 
This Part proceeds as follows.  Section A considers a board’s possible 
responses to a disenfranchising presumption.  Section B outlines how 
fiduciary duty claims would be reviewed and Section C outlines how 
contract claims would be reviewed, both with a focus on Identity Risk.  
Section D explores extending the framework.  Section E looks back at prior 
cases. 
A. Satisfying Identity Risk’s Disenfranchising Presumption 
The Blasius standard incorporated into Liquid Audio has two parts:  
primary purpose and compelling justification.  Thus, a board attempting to 
 
 257.  MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
ARTICLE 7 (MIXON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:22 PM 
1360 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
satisfy the disenfranchising presumption can attack both parts.  First, a 
board that adopted a proxy put for the primary purpose of protecting 
against Identity Risk should concede that the proxy put is disenfranchising 
and instead focus on demonstrating that the proxy put provides protection 
against known looters or persons of suspect integrity that might take over 
the board through a proxy fight.  Second, a board could also seek to rebut 
that the primary purpose of adopting the proxy put was disenfranchising.  
For example, the primary purpose of the Severance agreements in Hills was 
to prevent the covered executives from quitting in the face of Dickstein’s 
hostile takeover attempts.  In either case, the board is best served by clear 
evidence of its purpose in adopting the proxy put.  Rebutting the 
presumption is not meant to be difficult, but to incentivize boards to 
document their negotiations and deliberations leading up to their adoption 
or exercise of a proxy put. 
However, the path that the board chooses impacts the subsequent 
analysis.  By rebutting the presumption, the ordinary Unocal standards 
would apply.  Alternatively, by conceding that the primary purpose of the 
proxy put is disenfranchising, certain portions of the analysis would be 
influenced by Blasius’s compelling justification standard, as demonstrated 
below. 
B. Reviewing Fiduciary Duty Claims 
As established in Moran and recognized in SandRidge, both a board’s 
decision to adopt a change of control provision and a board’s decision to 
trigger the change of control provision are challengeable.258  In addition, as 
stated above, this Comment adopts the Liquid Audio standard of review for 
proxy puts. 
1. Challenging A Board’s Decision to Adopt a Proxy Put 
A board’s decision to adopt a proxy put would be reviewed under 
Liquid Audio’s unified standard.  Under Liquid Audio review, rebutting the 
disenfranchising presumption satisfies the standard’s condition precedent to 
questions of proportionality and reasonableness.  Afterwards, the familiar 
two-prong Unocal standard applies.  As an initial matter, by narrowing the 
proper purpose of a proxy put to protecting against Identity Risk, the 
grounds on which a board may validly defend its decision to adopt a proxy 
put are similarly narrow.  A board would support its decision to adopt the 
 
 258.  SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 259 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 
(Del. 1985)). 
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proxy put one of two ways.  Either the board would rebut the 
disenfranchising presumption by demonstrating that the proxy put was 
adopted for a purpose other than protecting against Identity Risk and 
thereafter demonstrate that the proxy put’s components are proportionate to 
its purpose.  Or the board would concede that the proxy put was adopted 
for the primary purpose of disenfranchising and instead demonstrate that 
the proxy put’s components are proportionate to a compelling 
justification—something it should be able to do with ease as protecting 
against Identity Risk justifies a much larger remedy. 
A stockholder challenging the validity of the board’s decision to adopt 
the proxy puts would only be able to do so by demonstrating that the proxy 
put is not proportionate to the purpose for which it was adopted.  However, 
a stockholder would be able to argue against the board’s purported purpose 
for adopting the proxy put in order to challenge its proportionality against a 
different standard:  a proxy put adopted to protect against Identity Risk 
would be disproportionate if its trigger prevents more than the election of 
known looters or persons of suspect integrity or if its remedy provides a 
creditor with significantly more than the basic right to put its debt back to 
the company at par. 
Unocal review would proceed as follows.  Applying the first prong to 
a board’s decision to adopt a proxy put is simple:  did the board have an 
informed, good faith belief that the proxy put protects against Identity 
Risk?259  Alternatively, if the board rebutted the disenfranchising 
presumption by demonstrating that protecting against Identity Risk was not 
the primary purpose of the challenged proxy put, the board would only 
have to demonstrate that it had an informed, good faith belief that 
something posed a threat to the company, even if the threat does not arise 
from Identity Risk. 
Second, the board would have to demonstrate that the proxy put 
operates in proportion to its proper purpose.  Kahan and Klausner’s 
description of a proxy put’s operative provisions, as well as the Amylin 
court’s insistence that a board receive extraordinary consideration for 
granting a proxy put, identify three components that inform Unocal’s 
proportionality review:  the proxy put’s trigger and remedy, and the 
consideration the company received.  Notwithstanding the court’s 
comments in Amylin, however, the clear protection a proxy put also gives 
the company against Identity Risk suggests that a proxy put has defensive 
 
 259.  This would also satisfy Schnell’s concern that board action be taken for a proper 
purpose; in this case, protecting against Identity Risk is a proxy put’s only proper purpose.  
See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (finding against board 
actions taken for “inequitable purposes [and] contrary to established principles of corporate 
democracy”). 
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value independent of any bargained-for benefit negotiated from a creditor.  
In other words, because both a company and its creditors benefit from a 
proxy put’s protection against Identity Risk, the board need not necessarily 
extract additional concessions from its counterparty. 
If a board seeks to include a proxy put, the board’s informed, good 
faith belief that it is in the best interest of the company and its stockholders 
to give itself a lever to deter known looters or persons of suspect integrity 
from winning a board majority would alone be a compelling justification.  
When the board adopts a proxy put for its independent value, this trade-off 
between protecting the company from Identity Risk and the stockholder’s 
fundamental right to elect the board can only be proportionate if the trigger 
is narrowly tailored to protecting against Identity Risk, because only when 
protecting against Identity Risk is the put remedy reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed.  Thus, a proxy put adopted in good faith and on an 
informed basis for its independent defensive value satisfies Liquid Audio’s 
condition precedent to Unocal review if its trigger is narrowly tailored to 
protecting against Identity Risk and similarly satisfies Unocal’s 
proportionality review.  Alternatively, if a creditor seeks to include a proxy 
put, the board should consider whether its independent value is worth the 
cost to the stockholder franchise and attempt to negotiate for additional 
concessions as urged by the court in Amylin. 
Notwithstanding a proxy put’s independent value, as suggested 
previously and discussed by Kahan and Klausner, a proxy put might also be 
adopted for mixed purposes exceeding Identity Risk and be structured to 
trigger under circumstances other than the unapproved election of a new 
board majority.  Even though related to Identity Risk, the proportionality of 
these mixed-purpose proxy puts is discussed in greater detail in Section D 
below. 
As an additional claim, the court acknowledged in Healthways its 
willingness to consider a device’s deterrent effect on the stockholder 
franchise to be an ongoing, actionable harm.260  This analysis would closely 
follow the adoption analysis with a focus on whether the remedy’s 
deterrent effect is disproportionate to the proxy put’s purpose.  However, 
assuming the board reserved discretion to approve a rival slate that does not 
consist of known looters or persons of suspect integrity, a stockholder 
arguably could not be deterred from nominating a rival slate unless and 
until the board acts to disapprove the slate (in which case the stockholder’s 
claim would relate to the board’s exercise of its approval), or refuses to act 
one way or another (in which case the stockholder’s claim would be that 
the board is acting in bad faith as demonstrated by SandRidge itself).  In 
 
 260.  Healthways Transcript, at 78–80. 
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any event, narrowing the proper purpose of proxy puts to Identity Risk 
would also narrow the court’s deterrence analysis in Healthways by 
narrowing the circumstances under which a stockholder might be deterred.  
Finally, a proxy put with an automatic trigger would have a much stronger 
deterrence effect and, as discussed above, is arguably a facially invalid 
abdication of a board’s fiduciary duties or, at minimum, would require the 
board to rebut the disenfranchising presumption in all circumstances. 
2. Challenging a Board’s Decision to Trigger a Proxy Put 
A board’s decision to exercise its discretion under a proxy put would 
be similarly reviewed under a Liquid Audio standard, but the framework 
differs in two respects:  the good faith prong should be ratcheted up by the 
compelling justification standard261 and the proportionality prong would 
necessarily require an adoption analysis.  First, considering the narrow 
basis for validly adopting a proxy put, the only unique board action 
separating its contractual duty to its creditors and its fiduciary duties to the 
company and its stockholders is its informed, good faith belief that the rival 
slate consists of known looters or persons of suspect integrity.  As 
suggested above, the board’s burdens of production and persuasion here 
would be influenced by the compelling justification standard.  Given the 
potentially staggering consequences of triggering a validly adopted proxy 
put, a board’s informed, good faith belief that electing the rival slate would 
pass control of the company to known looters or persons of suspect 
integrity should be supported by compelling evidence.  In other words, in 
order to rebut the disenfranchising presumption after conceding primary 
purpose, the board should have to demonstrate that it formed its good faith 
belief based on compelling evidence justifying the magnitude of its 
decision to trigger the put remedy.  As demonstrated in Section C below, 
this determination also relates to a counterparty’s potential claim that the 
board breached its duty of contract.  In either case, requiring compelling 
evidence provides the board with a strong basis for defending against 
fiduciary duty claims and creates a high hurdle for creditors suing in 
contract to overcome. 
Second, a board cannot validly exercise an invalidly adopted proxy 
put.  Thus, assuming the board demonstrated that it had reached an 
informed, good faith belief based on compelling evidence that the rival 
slate posed a threat to the company arising from Identity Risk, the 
proportionality analysis would necessarily shift its focus to the board’s 
 
 261.  For mixed-purpose proxy puts, discussed infra part VI.D., the good faith prong is 
not ratcheted up by the compelling justification standard. 
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decision to adopt the proxy put in the first place.  As an initial matter, the 
board would already have shown that the threat posed is proportionate to 
the trigger itself by demonstrating its informed, good faith belief that the 
threat arises from Identity Risk.  Beyond that, however, whether the 
remedy and consideration are proportionate to the proper purpose of 
protecting against Identity Risk necessarily requires a record of the board’s 
negotiations and deliberations leading to the proxy put’s adoption.  Because 
a board’s decision to trigger a proxy put after satisfying the good faith 
prong is a contractual duty, it is thus independent from a contemporaneous 
conclusion that the remedy and consideration are disproportionate.  In order 
for the remedy and consideration to be proportionate at exercise, they must 
have been proportionate at adoption.262  The contours of this analysis are set 
forth above and thus not repeated here. 
The trade-off between stockholder, company, and creditor interests by 
its nature places the board under enormous pressure.  Upon considering 
whether to trigger a proxy put, a board should recognize that it will 
probably be sued, either by stockholders or by creditors, regardless of its 
conclusion.  The goal of this Identity Risk framework, however, is not to 
create a jump ball scenario in which it would never be clear to creditors or 
stockholders when proxy puts may be validly adopted or exercised.  
Instead, the goal is to incentivize boards to adopt and exercise proxy puts 
for the (proposed) proper purpose of protecting against Identity Risk and to 
document both negotiations and deliberations leading to their decision to 
do so.  If negotiated, deliberated, and documented appropriately, a board 
reduces the risk of liability to either party.  First, as the counterparty to the 
proxy put, a creditor should never have any doubt as to why the proxy put 
was adopted and should have the same evidence as the board as to whether 
a rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity Risk.  A mere difference of 
opinion is resolved in favor of the board, both in contractual and fiduciary 
terms.263 
 
 262.  Incidentally, this follows from Hills, where the court estopped the plaintiff from 
challenging the proportionality of the board’s decision to trigger the Severance agreements 
because the plaintiff had contractually waived its right to challenge the proportionality of 
the board’s decision to adopt the agreements in the first place.  See Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 
769 A.2d 88, 107 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“The plaintiffs cannot in good faith claim that the 
Severance is a disproportionate response in a situation when the Hills board, on a good faith 
and informed basis, concluded that a Change in Control was adverse to the interests of Hills 
and its stockholders.  To find otherwise would be to say that the plaintiffs waived nothing 
when they agreed not to challenge the adoption of the Employment Agreements.”). 
 263.  That is, the contract expressly grants the board the right to exercise its discretion as 
to whether the rival slate poses Identity Risk.  Furthermore, a board arguably lacks authority 
to adopt a proxy put that grants the creditor its fiduciary duty to determine whether a rival 
slate poses an Identity Risk to the company and its stockholders. 
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Second, a board should disclose to its stockholders that it adopted a 
proxy put, its narrow purpose for doing so, and the narrow circumstances in 
which the board would be required to trigger the proxy put.  
Fundamentally, however, when facing competing fiduciary and contract 
claims, the board’s contractual duty to trigger the proxy put would be 
consistent with its fiduciary duties to the company and its stockholders.  
Such is the purpose of narrowing the validity of proxy puts to protecting 
against Identity Risk:  the stockholders’, creditors’, and company’s 
interests under the circumstances would be aligned.  Whether a board has 
breached its contractual duty to trigger a proxy put is discussed in the 
following Section. 
C. Reviewing Contract Claims 
A creditor’s claim that the company breached its contractual duty 
under a proxy put will only arise from a board’s decision to approve a rival 
slate and neutralize the creditor’s put remedy.  Determining whether a 
board exercised its discretion under a proxy put in breach of its contractual 
duties turns first on whether the proxy put actually grants the board such 
power.  As suggested in Amylin and Healthways, a board’s adoption of a 
proxy put with an automatic trigger denying the board power to neutralize 
the remedy is arguably a facial abdication of its fiduciary duties to the 
company and its stockholders or, at minimum, is invalid without a 
compelling justification.264  For present purposes, however, this Comment 
considers only proxy puts that grant power to the board to exercise its 
discretion and determine whether to trigger the proxy put’s remedy. 
The test in Amylin for whether a board has the contractual right to 
approve a proxy put was clarified above.265  The test has two parts:  A 
board has the contractual right under a proxy put to approve a rival slate if 
(1) the board determines on an informed, good faith basis that passing 
control to the rival slate would not be a breach of its duty of loyalty to the 
company or its stockholders, and (2) approving the rival slate is not a 
breach of its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Defining 
Identity Risk as the proper purpose of proxy puts would also attach the 
disenfranchising presumption to whether the board has the right to approve 
a rival slate.  The disenfranchising presumption focuses the first part of this 
test on whether the board’s informed, good faith belief was based on 
compelling evidence and the second part of this test on whether the board 
 
 264.  Amylin, 983 A.2d 304, 315 nn. 31–32 (Del. Ch. 2009); Healthways Transcript at 
75, 80–81. 
 265.  See discussion, supra part II.B. 
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has deprived the creditor of its bargained-for protection. 
In contrast to a fiduciary duty claim, here a board would defend its 
decision to approve the rival slate and neutralize the proxy put one of two 
ways.  First, the board would argue that the proxy put was adopted to 
protect against Identity Risk, but that it lacks compelling evidence to 
believe in good faith that the rival slate poses a threat arising from Identity 
Risk.  For example, a board may have determined in good faith that passing 
control to the rival slate would be a breach of its duty of loyalty to the 
company—yet also determine in good faith that the threat posed by the 
rival slate does not relate to the creditor’s bargained-for protection from 
Identity Risk.  In such a situation, a board has the right to approve the rival 
slate for purposes of the proxy put without frustrating the device’s purpose 
of protecting the creditor from Identity Risk.266  Signaling the likelihood of 
this outcome would incentivize creditors to protect themselves from Event 
Risk with covenants more narrowly designed to do so.  Second, the board 
may have compelling evidence that the rival slate poses a threat arising 
from Identity Risk, but argue that it has no duty to trigger the put remedy 
because it was not adopted to protect against such a risk.  Because this 
Comment proposes that protecting against Identity Risk should be the only 
proper purpose of a proxy put, this second argument depends on the device 
in question being something other than a proxy put.  As such, discussion of 
that possibility is reserved to Section D below. 
A creditor would make the opposite arguments:  either the proxy put 
was adopted to protect against Identity Risk and the board acted in bad 
faith by ignoring compelling evidence that the rival slate posed such a 
threat; or, the device in question was not adopted to protect against Identity 
Risk so the board’s duty to trigger the device does not require compelling 
evidence, and thus the board acted in bad faith by denying the creditor 
otherwise valid bargained-for protection.  Again, this second argument 
depends on the device in question being something other than a proxy put 
and is discussed in greater detail below. 
This contractual analysis purposefully mirrors the fiduciary duty 
analysis above.  In order for the board to validly trigger a proxy put without 
breaching its fiduciary duties, the proxy put must have been designed and 
adopted for the primary purpose of defending against Identity Risk and the 
board must have compelling evidence to support an informed, good faith 
belief that the rival slate in fact poses a threat arising from Identity Risk, 
 
 266.  Although dicta, the court in Hills recognized that if the board had approved the 
Dickstein Change of Control, it would have denied the Covered Executives of the exact 
protection the Employment Agreements were designed to provide and thereby breached its 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.  See Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del. 
Ch. 2000). 
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among other things.  Without meeting these requirements, the board 
arguably lacked authority to grant the protection in the first place, 
rendering the creditor’s interest in the proxy put’s exercise unenforceable.  
Therefore, within an Identity Risk framework, a creditor would have no 
reasonable expectation of protection absent the board’s satisfaction of the 
above requirements.  In other words, a creditor cannot prove a breach of 
contract without also proving that the board breached its fiduciary duty of 
loyalty by passing control of the company to a rival slate of known looters 
or persons of suspect integrity notwithstanding compelling evidence in 
support of such a determination.  The potency of proxy puts would thus 
require both parties to believe in good faith that they are each agreeing to it 
for a proper purpose and recognize that for the board to have the authority 
to grant the protection, its ability to trigger the remedy must be 
circumstantially narrow.  As emphasized above, this framework would 
allow boards and creditors to confidently adopt valid, enforceable proxy 
puts by aligning stockholders’, companies’, and creditors’ interests in 
Identity Risk protection.  That the framework of review of contract claims 
would mirror the framework of review of fiduciary duty claims in 
maintaining the alignment of those interests is self-evident. 
D. Extending the Framework 
By now, one might validly question whether the adoption of proxy 
puts would continue if subject to this Identity Risk framework.  As stated 
previously, the purpose of this framework is not to discourage the use of 
proxy puts, but to limit the device’s validity to legally and equitably 
defensible circumstances and to incentivize parties to adapt devices to 
protect against Event Risk without interfering with the stockholder 
franchise to the extent proxy puts do.  This Section explores extending the 
framework to devices resembling proxy puts but that reach beyond the 
narrow, primary purpose of protecting against Identity Risk and to devices 
that are arguably not proxy puts at all. 
Adopting this Identity Risk framework would probably have the 
following effect on proxy puts.  First, the validity of existing proxy puts 
would be narrowed by the presumption that their only valid primary 
purpose is to protect against Identity Risk.  Such proxy puts would 
arguably remain valid, subject to their exercise under compelling 
circumstances.  Second, new proxy puts adopted for the primary purpose of 
protecting against Identity Risk would be adapted to this framework.  
Finally, for existing or new proxy puts whose primary purpose is arguably 
not to protect against Identity Risk, the device’s components would be 
drafted to be proportionate to that purpose.  This Section considers this 
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final category of mixed-purpose proxy puts, which resemble proxy puts 
that arguably serve a primary purpose other than protecting against Identity 
Risk, and other devices, which are neither triggered by a proxy fight 
replacing a majority of the board nor provide a put remedy. 
As discussed previously, a board may seek to rebut the 
disenfranchising presumption by arguing that a mixed-purpose proxy put 
was adopted for a primary purpose other than protecting against Identity 
Risk.  Consistent with this Comment’s argument that a creditor’s only valid 
interest in a proxy put should be avoiding the harm arising from Identity 
Risk, a board would only grant a creditor a proxy put for a different 
purpose by narrowing the proxy put’s components to be proportionate to 
that purpose.  Furthermore, a board’s failure to demonstrate that the 
components of a mixed-purpose proxy put are proportionate to its purpose 
would be strong evidence that the primary purpose of the device was in fact 
disenfranchising.  For example, in Healthways, SunTrust argued that as a 
lender, it had a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of its borrower: 
[I]t’s really designed to sort of give the creditors an opportunity 
to evaluate the credit situation and the risk situation if either 
within a one-year period or a two-year period there suddenly is a 
change in the composition of the board so that the majority is all 
of a sudden different.267 
. . . 
[I]f you have a fundamental change, where a majority of your 
board turns over, it just gives the borrower the ability to 
completely clean house, change management, change business 
direction, which obviously may show up in the form of other 
covenants, or may not.268 
There, the stated risk to SunTrust was not that a new board would 
consist of known looters or persons of suspect integrity, but that a new 
board might change the direction of the business without triggering any of 
the creditor’s other protective covenants.  Even assuming SunTrust’s 
interest in such protection was legitimate and non-pretextual, both 
SunTrust and Healthways failed to demonstrate how a put remedy above 
par was proportionate to any harm that might arise from a new board 
simply taking the company in a different direction.  In this scenario, the 
SunTrust proxy put would have been more defensible had it drafted a 
double trigger requiring not only an unapproved election of a new board 
majority, but also a decline in Healthways’ credit rating within a reasonable 
 
 267.  Healthways Transcript at 26. 
 268.  Healthways Transcript at 27. 
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period of time.269  And even with a narrower trigger, it is not clear how an 
enormous put remedy would be proportionate to harm arising from a mere 
change in credit rating.  Alternatively, under the facts of Healthways, a dual 
trigger proxy put providing an interest rate adjustment upon a credit rating 
decline occurring within a reasonable period of time after a change in board 
majority would probably have been proportionate to SunTrust’s stated 
purpose.  Additionally, since neither Healthways nor its stockholders would 
benefit from this protection the same way they would from protection 
against Identity Risk, the board probably would have to have negotiated for 
a proportionate concession from SunTrust.  But because the proxy put’s 
components were so disproportionate to SunTrust’s stated purpose, the 
court could have reasonably concluded that the proxy put’s primary 
purpose was disenfranchising. 
This example is not comprehensive, but highlights two facts.  First, 
very few compelling justifications, if any, support a creditor’s interest in 
putting its debt back to the company at a premium above par upon the 
stockholders’ election of a new board majority.  This Comment suggests 
that the only compelling justification for such an extreme toll on the 
stockholder franchise is when the creditor’s interests are aligned with those 
of the company and the stockholders, namely, in order to protect against 
Identity Risk.  Second, because a creditor’s valid interest in a proxy put is 
so limited, a board that grants a creditor the protection of a device 
resembling a proxy put, but for the primary purpose of protecting against 
something other than Identity Risk, may only do so if the device’s 
components are narrowly proportionate to another valid purpose.  Here, 
relating the device’s trigger to the stockholder franchise is arguably 
justified, but providing a put remedy is probably not.  Thus, it is possible 
that the only valid proxy put purporting to protect a creditor from 
something other than Identity Risk is one whose trigger and remedy are 
adapted so that the device no longer in fact operates as a proxy put. 
Although this Comment has primarily focused on proxy puts in 
lending agreements, the Identity Risk framework explored herein is 
reasonably extended to proxy puts adopted in other types of agreements.  
For example, in Hills, the board entered into Severance agreements with 
certain covered executives that included large buy-out provisions that 
triggered upon the unapproved election of the Dickstein slate.270  Within an 
 
 269.  Consistent with SunTrust’s argument, this dual trigger differs from a pure rating 
decline trigger in that it protects against the risk of a new board on whom SunTrust was 
unable to conduct due diligence.  In other words, SunTrust contracted for the risk that the 
direction of the business under the current board might lead to a credit rating decline, but 
not for such a risk under the leadership or direction of a new board. 
 270.  Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 91–92 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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Identity Risk framework, the Hills board probably would have rebutted the 
disenfranchising presumption because, as the court in Hills concluded, the 
board entered into the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of 
retaining the covered executives at a time when they were likely to resign 
their positions.271  These agreements are materially different than the debt 
agreements containing proxy puts considered throughout this Comment.  
Unlike creditors, the covered executives in Hills had the power and the 
right to protect themselves from any perceived risk of harm by terminating 
their agreements and walking away.272  And after the company granted the 
Severance agreement, the covered executives avoided harming the 
company and any perceived risk of harm to them arising from the change 
of control by staying at Hills until the triggering event.  Importantly, the 
threat of harm to Hills in the Dickstein Change of Control did not arise 
from Dickstein’s identity, but instead from his plans to dramatically 
increase leverage after winning board control.  Thus, the board could not 
have adopted the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of 
disenfranchising the stockholders because Dickstein posed a threat of harm 
to the company arising from Event Risk, not Identity Risk, and protecting 
against Event Risk is not a compelling justification. 
This example highlights the fact that boards enter into agreements 
with other parties whose interests in the identity of a new board majority 
may not be as limited as a creditor’s interest is.  Employment agreements 
are one such example.  A license agreement is another.  Consider a 
company whose business relies heavily on a license agreement granting it 
an exclusive right to use patented technology.  There, the licensor is 
probably unconcerned with the identity of a new board majority under most 
circumstances, but is probably very concerned about a direct competitor 
taking control of the board and gaining access to the licensed technology.  
A provision that protects the licensor from such a change in board majority, 
rather than a change in ownership or control of the company itself, by 
requiring the company to terminate its use of the licensed technology at no 
cost to the licensor is arguably disenfranchising by virtue of penalizing the 
stockholders for exercising their franchise.  Yet the board’s primary 
 
 271.  Id. at 102. 
 272.  Even though the court in SandRidge pointed out that the covered executives in 
Hills did have an interest in the identity of the board that differed in kind and degree from a 
creditor’s interest, SandRidge, 68 A.3d at 262, the covered executives’ interests in the 
Severance agreements did not arise from any exposure to Identity Risk as defined in this 
Comment.  As stated, the covered executives could have avoided any such risk by quitting.  
Instead, the Severance agreements arose from the company’s exposure to harm upon the 
covered executives’ mass departure.  Though subtle, this distinction clarifies that the 
Identity Risk framework is concerned with the company’s primary purpose, not that of its 
counterparty. 
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purpose in adopting the provision was not to disenfranchise the 
stockholders, but to secure the rights to the patented technology upon 
which its business heavily relies in the first place.  Thus, a board would 
only have to rebut the disenfranchising presumption and demonstrate the 
device’s proportionality rather than a compelling justification.  Again, this 
is because the licensor’s interest in protection against a new board majority 
arose from the narrow risk that its patented technology would fall into a 
competitor’s hands, not the risk that a new board majority would consist of 
known looters or individuals of suspect integrity. 
As the above examples demonstrate, reviewing proxy puts, mixed-
purpose proxy puts, and other devices related to the shareholder franchise 
within this Comment’s Identity Risk framework is advisable because 
boards will probably continue including them in various agreements.  In 
fact, the framework specifically contemplates boards doing so by defining 
Identity Risk narrowly and making clear both how to validly adopt and 
exercise a proxy put and how to avoid compelling justification review for 
mixed-purpose proxy puts and other devices.  Accordingly, reviewing the 
adoption and exercise of these devices within an Identity Risk framework 
regulates a board’s ability to do so validly by attaching the disenfranchising 
presumption.  Anticipating the need to rebut the presumption, a board will 
either adopt proxy puts for the primary purpose of protecting the company 
from Identity Risk or document its negotiations and deliberations in 
support of the primary purpose of protecting the company from a threat 
falling outside the scope of Identity Risk.  Finally, the disenfranchising 
presumption also signals to the market that devices closely resembling 
proxy puts are more likely to require compelling justification review and 
encourages the development of more narrowly tailored change of control 
provisions.  These modifications would not only increase the value of these 
devices to companies and to creditors by more efficiently reducing agency 
costs of debt and equity, but also increase the ability of the court to conduct 
its compelling justification and proportionality reviews by incentivizing 
thorough recordkeeping. 
E. Reconsidering Prior Cases 
This framework would not have materially altered the outcomes of 
Hills and SandRidge, but may have had an impact on the outcome in 
Amylin.  First, the court in Hills still would have concluded that the board 
did not adopt the Severance agreements for the primary purpose of 
disenfranchising the stockholders, held that the board made an informed, 
good faith determination that the Dickstein Change of Control posed a 
threat to the company, and estopped the plaintiff from arguing that the 
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remedy under the agreements was disproportionate to its proper purpose.  
Second, assuming the SandRidge board conceded that the proxy put was 
disenfranchising because it was adopted for the narrow purpose of 
protecting against Identity Risk, the court in SandRidge still would have 
concluded that the SandRidge board had failed to exercise its fiduciary 
duties in good faith by failing to neutralize the proxy put and that its 
fiduciary duty to do so did not breach its contractual duty to its creditor.  
Accordingly, the court in SandRidge still would never have reached a 
proportionality analysis. 
By contrast, if the court in Amylin had faced the same record, the court 
probably would have concluded that the board had the contractual right to 
trigger the proxy put in the absence of compelling evidence that the rival 
slate was composed of known looters or persons of suspect integrity.  
However, the court in Amylin could have reached any conclusion with a 
complete record had this framework incentivized the parties to document 
their negotiations and deliberations thoroughly. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment began by identifying two questions left unanswered in 
SandRidge.  First, does a board of directors have the requisite authority to 
bind the corporation to a proxy put designed to prevent stockholders from 
electing a new board of directors?  Second, under what circumstances and 
to what degree is a board of directors permitted to trade its stockholders’ 
right to elect the board of directors in favor of other interests?  Finding the 
broad characterization of proxy puts in SandRidge to be of dubious validity 
under both the first and second questions, this Comment interpreted 
narrowly SandRidge and other cases addressing proxy puts and explored 
the components and operation of proxy puts in order to establish a stronger 
legal basis for upholding them.  Given the limited extent to which proxy 
puts provide unique protection, this Comment suggested that a board of 
directors should only have the authority to adopt a proxy put for the limited 
purpose of protecting against Identity Risk—a concern distinct from Event 
Risk proposed herein—and even then may only adopt and exercise proxy 
puts that are narrowly tailored to that limited purpose.  In order to regulate 
shareholder-creditor agency costs arising from proxy puts, this Comment 
adopted a Liquid Audio standard of review in order to account for both a 
disenfranchising presumption that attaches to proxy puts comporting with 
Identity Risk and a subsequent proportionality and reasonableness analysis 
consistent with Unocal review. 
This Comment found that adopting an Identity Risk framework 
provides boards and creditors with a reasonable amount of clarity regarding 
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the circumstances under which they will be subject to Blasius’s compelling 
justification review, the circumstances under which they will be subject to 
Unocal’s heightened reasonableness review, and the requirements for 
staying within either and satisfying both.  This clarity is valuable especially 
in light of the recent Healthways case, which demonstrated the court’s 
willingness to find a creditor liable for aiding and abetting a board’s breach 
of its fiduciary duties in adopting a proxy put for an improper purpose—
even if the case was only decided on a motion to dismiss.  Finding the 
navigation of this framework to be relatively simple, this Comment 
concludes that narrowing the validity of proxy puts to protecting against 
Identity Risk would probably reduce creditor-shareholder agency costs by 
discouraging, but not prohibiting, boards and creditors from adopting proxy 
puts in favor of less disenfranchising devices that are more narrowly 
tailored to other purposes and also by incentivizing boards and creditors to 
document negotiations and deliberations relating to change of control 
provisions by attaching a disenfranchising presumption to devices 
resembling proxy puts.  Taken together, this approach aligns a company’s 
interests in proxy puts with those of its creditors’ and stockholders’ and 
makes Delaware more creditor-friendly by recognizing legitimate creditor 
interests and framing clearly the circumstances under and extent to which a 
board of directors may validly protect those interests through contract 
provisions. 
 
